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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did Calder have adequate notice of the charges against

him in light of the scope of the allegations set forth in formal
complaints, F-253 and F-274?
2.

Is the application of Section 48-21-15 of the Motor

Vehicle Code relevant to the misconduct of Calder in his
representation of Bailey?
3.

Are the Disciplinary Hearing Panel's Findings,

Conclusions and Recommendation of Discipline merely advisory or
will such findings only be set aside if arbitrary, capricious or
unsupported by substantial evidence?
4.

Are the Findings of Fact of the Disciplinary Hearing

Panel based upon substantial evidence in the record?
5.

Did the Disciplinary Hearing Panel err by failing to

find any mitigating factors in its Recommendation of Discipline?
6.

Is the recommendation of disbarment disproportionate

given that the Disciplinary Hearing Panel found no fewer than
fifteen (15) violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct of
the Utah State Bar, no mitigating circumstances and several
aggravating circumstances?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about February 16, 1989, a Disciplinary Hearing Panel
[hereinafter referred to as "Panel"] comprised of Robert
Stansfield, Chair, Richard Makoff and Molly Sumner recommended
that J. Richard Calder be disbarred from the practice of law in
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the State of Utah.

That recommendation concluded five (5) days

of trial held on November 14 and 15, 1988, December 2, 3 and 20,
1988, and January 23, 1989.

During the trial Special Bar

Counsel, David E. Leta, represented the Office of Bar Counsel,
Utah State Bar.

The Board of Bar Commissioners [hereinafter

referred to as "Board"] adopted the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Recommendation of the Panel on March 24, 1989.
Thereafter, Calder filed with the Board a timely objection to the
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation.

A three-member panel

of the Board comprised of James Clegg, James Davis and Hans
Chamberlain conducted a five-hour hearing on Appellant's
Objections after which it recommended to the Board that the
Panel's recommendation of disbarment be affirmed.

The Board

adopted the three-member Hearing Panel's Recommendation and
accordingly entered its Order.

Calder now appeals the Board's

Order as well as the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Recommendation of Discipline by the Panel.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts set forth in Calder's Brief are almost exclusively
fashioned from Calder's testimony and merely put forward Calder's
characterization of the evidence.

Respondent therefore sets

forth the following facts consistent with the findings of the
Panel.

The misconduct of Calder resulting in a recommendation of

disbarment involves two clients, Larry Bailey and Dennis Job; the
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conduct of Calder as set forth below clearly establishes a
pattern of conduct which subordinates the interests of his
clients to his own interests in making a living.
A.

Bailey:

F-274

Bailey, a truck driver for 22 years, retained Calder in 1978
to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on his behalf.

In hiring

Calder, Bailey expected that he would receive a discharge in
bankruptcy of a judgment debt incurred as a result of an
automobile accident along with a discharge of his other debts.
The debt was related to property damage suffered by Richard and
Moena Harris in the sum of $1,400.

The discharge of the debt was

a primary reason for Bailey filing bankruptcy.

Calder failed to

list that judgment debt on Bailey's bankruptcy schedules; as a
result, Bailey did not obtain a discharge of that indebtedness.
Tr., 27-29; 31-33; 305.
After filing the Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Bailey attempted to
renew his driver's license and was informed by Utah Department of
Motor Vehicles personnel that unless he could prove that the
judgment debt had been discharged or satisfied he could not renew
his driver's license.

Tr., 35-36.

So, Bailey went back to

Calder to obtain "proof" of the discharge of the judgment debt.
Calder, relying on Bailey's representation that he could not
renew his driver's license without proof of the discharge, sent a
letter on behalf of Bailey to the Department of Motor Vehicles
indicating that the debt was discharged.

The Department would

not accept the letter as sufficient proof of the discharge.
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Bailey then obtained the bankruptcy schedules at which time he
discovered the debt had not been listed and was not discharged.
Tr., 29; 35-37; Exhibit B-4.
Bailey again went back to Calder to have him correct the
omission by amending the schedules to include the debt.

As as

result, Calder, on or about March 28, 1979, filed an Application
for Leave to Amend Bailey1s bankruptcy schedules.

In that

application, however, Calder misidentified the judgment creditor.
Consequently, on August 21, 1979, when Bailey received the
discharge in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the correct judgment debt
was still not listed and therefore not discharged.
again unable to renew his driver's license.

Bailey was

Between 1979 and

1983, Bailey contacted Calder to determine if his bankruptcy
schedules had been amended.

Calder represented to Bailey that he

was working on the matter and sent Bailey a letter to that effect
in January 1982. Tr., 37-38; 43; Exhibit B-5, B-8, B-ll.
Frustrated that his schedules were still not properly
amended, Bailey complained to the Utah State Bar in 1983.

As a

result of the complaint, Jeff Paoletti, then Bar Counsel,
intervened and Calder agreed to take the necessary steps to amend
the schedules, add the omitted judgment and obtain the discharge.
Calder agreed to accomplish these objectives if Bailey would pay
to him the sum of $10.00.
requested.

Bailey paid the $10.00 to Calder as

Paoletti's understanding of Calder's agreement to

represent Bailey was memorialized in a letter sent to Bailey on
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October 19, 1983.

Tr., 45-46; 121-128; 315; 324-326.

Exhibits

B-12, B-13.
Subsequently, Calder discovered that the bankruptcy case had
been closed and the files forwarded to central filing in Denver,
Colorado.

Calder then informed Bailey that he would need an

additional $120 for attorney's fees and costs to amend the
schedules and obtain the discharge.

Bailey again contacted the

Utah State Bar to complain about the additional fees.

Jeff

Paoletti again intervened and discussed the matter with Calder.
Calder, based on his communication with Paoletti, agreed to go
forward for an additional sum of $15.00.
to Calder the $15.00.

Thereafter Bailey paid

Tr., 48-51; 124-125; Exhibit B-17.

Without any further demand for additional fees, Calder filed
the Motion to Reopen on or about January 12, 1984. That Motion,
Calder admitted at trial, was incomplete and was not sufficient
to effect the objective sought by Bailey.

Calder made no effort

to supplement that Motion or indicate to the court that he
intended to supplement it.

Tr., 335; 529.

Exhibit B-18; B-19.

On or about February 15, 1984, the Bankruptcy Court sua sponte
denied the Motion to Reopen.

On February 16, 1984, immediately

upon learning of the dismissal, Calder withdrew as Bailey1s
counsel.

Calder took no further steps to correct the Motion to

Reopen or achieve the desired objective of discharging the
judgment debt.

Tr., 335; Exhibits B-19, B-20.
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Finally, in 1984, Bailey hired Paul Van Dam, who correctly
filed the appropriate motion to reopen and amend the schedules.
The schedules were amended and the judgment debt discharged.
Bailey eventually renewed his driver's license in 1988. Tr.,
56-61.

In the interim, between 1984 and 1988, Bailey suffered

extreme emotional distress, could not obtain a driver's license
and was unable to secure steady employment.

Tr., 60-61.

In 1986, Bailey filed a malpractice action against Calder
styled Bailey v. Calder, No. C86-800, Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah.

During the pendency of that

malpractice action, Calder signed and filed an affidavit in that
malpractice action.

In that affidavit Calder swore under oath

that he had not represented Bailey since 1978 and had only
attempted to help Bailey amend his bankruptcy schedules "at the
request of the Bar." Calder filed that affidavit intending that
the trial judge would rely on his statements.

Calder admitted at

the disciplinary trial that those statements in the affidavit
were false.

His motive in doing so was to escape responsibility

to Bailey for his failure to obtain a discharge of the judgment
debt.

Tr., 336-340; Exhibit B-26.

B.

Job: F-253

In 1983, Dennis Job retained Calder to file a Chapter 7
bankruptcy on Job's behalf.

Job had been involved in the

baseball industry all his life and had a franchise in Salt Lake
City.

At the time Job sought Calder's assistance, Job was
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experiencing financial difficulties necessitating bankruptcy.
Job, at that time, was also a litigant in a federal court lawsuit
involving one of the baseball franchises and the franchise
contract.

The lawsuit claimed damages in excess of $1 million,

[the lawsuit hereafter will be referred to as the "Pocklington
suit"].

Tr., 140-142.

Job wanted to discharge his debts but retain an interest in
the Pocklington suit.

Job testified at trial that he informed

Calder of the Pocklington suit, told him how important it was to
him and that he did not want the filing of bankruptcy to affect
his ability to pursue the Pocklington suit.

Job even gave Calder

the case name and case number of the Pocklington suit.

Tr., 143;

200.
Calder advised Job that he could file a Chapter 7 and that,
in all likelihood, the trustee would abandon the Pocklington suit
as an asset and Job could continue prosecuting the Pocklington
suit.

Relying on that advice, Job consented to the filing of the

Chapter 7.

Tr., 143-145.

When Job's Chapter 7 bankruptcy

schedules were prepared, however, the Pocklington suit was not
listed as an asset.

Calder, however, contended at trial that it

was listed; Job recalls seeing the asset on the working papers he
reviewed.

The bankruptcy schedules filed with the court clearly

show, however, that the Pocklington suit was not listed.
Though Calder testified at the disciplinary trial that Job
did not give him enough information about the Pocklington suit,
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he now "readily" admits in his brief to this Court at page 11
that he did not "take reasonable steps and precautions to insure
that this cause of action was properly scheduled and listed."
Tr., 145-146; Job Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Schedules.

Despite that

admission now, Calder previously filed an affidavit in a
malpractice action against him by Job

wherein Calder asserted

that the omission of the Pocklington suit was a result of Job
stealing a key to his office, surreptitiously entering it and
changing the schedules; Calder also asserted that his secretary
had changed the schedules or that someone at the bankruptcy court
changed the schedules.

Exhibit B-50.

After Job's Chapter 7 was closed and while the Pocklington
suit was pending, the opposing counsel discovered that the
Pocklington suit had not been listed as an asset in Job's
bankruptcy case.

Counsel filed a Motion to Reopen Job's Chapter

7 to list the Pocklington suit as an asset and cause a trustee,
rather than Job, to administer the asset.

The Motion also

charged Job with perjury and fraud for failing to list the
lawsuit.

It was at this time that Job first learned that the

Pocklington suit had not been listed in his bankruptcy schedules.
Job confronted Calder about the omission and asked him to resist

That malpractice action was filed September 11, 1984 and
styled Job v. Calder, C84-5436, Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 8

the Motion to Reopen.

Instead, Calder suggested that Job file a

Chapter 13 petition and consent to the reopening of the Chapter
7.

Though not happy with that recommendation because Job did not

have "regular income" and did not believe he would qualify for a
Chapter 13, Job accepted Calderfs advice and paid additional fees
to file a Chapter 13.

Tr., 147-153.

At that point, Job was not comfortable with Calder's
representation and only wanted to resist the Motion to Reopen to
clear his name.

Job discussed with Calder the consequences of

failing to attend the 341 meeting of creditors; Calder advised
him that the Chapter 13 would be dismissed without prejudice.
Not wanting to proceed with the Chapter 13, Job did not attend
the 341 meeting.

Rather than the Chapter 13 being dismissed

without prejudice, however, the trustee moved to dismiss the
Chapter 13 with prejudice and revoke the Chapter 7 discharge.
Tr., 153-158; 439.
Upon learning of the trustee's intention to file a Motion to
Dismiss, Calder filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw.

At the

time Calder filed this Motion, he did not advise Job that the
trustee had filed a Motion to Dismiss and that it would be
noticed up for hearing in the near future.

Calder also did not

attempt to protect Job's interests or to prevent prejudice to his
client due to his withdrawal.

Tr., 439-440; 160.

Job was unable to retain counsel prior to the hearing on the
Motion to Dismiss and attended the hearing without counsel.
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At

the hearing, Job consented to the dismissal of his Chapter 13
case.

The trustee's Motion to revoke the discharge under the

Chapter 7 was granted and the Chapter 7 case was vacated.

As a

result, Job found himself in exactly the same position with his
creditors as he was when he first retained Calder.

In addition,

however, at this juncture, he was also facing a pending
foreclosure on his home and was without income or prospective
income.

Tr., 161-163.

Job then sought to retain counsel to file a Chapter 11
petition to preclude foreclosure on his residence.

Because he

was unable to timely pay the required attorney's fees, however,
he could not retain counsel.

Job filed the Chapter 11 petition

pro se several minutes after the foreclosure sale on his home had
been conducted.

Tr., 168-170.

Thereafter, and during the

pendency of the Chapter 11 case, Job settled the Pocklington suit
for a small payment from the defendant, then sought and obtained
a dismissal of his Chapter 11 case.

Tr., 170-171.

Just prior to filing the Chapter 11 case, Job filed a
malpractice action against Calder.

During the pendency of

malpractice action, the Chapter 11 was dismissed.

Prior to the

trial on Job's malpractice lawsuit, Calder filed a Motion to
Re-open Job's Chapter 11 bankruptcy, alleging that Job committed
fraud, that he had engaged in tax evasion, that he omitted income
from his schedules and that Calder himself was an unscheduled
creditor, even though Calder had never sent Job a billing nor
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advised him of any outstanding fees that were due*

In fact,

Calder had no factual basis for the Motion and it was denied.
Tr., 172-174; Tab 43 of Bankruptcy Folder, No. 84C02521.
Thereafter, a trial was held on Job's malpractice action.
On January 10, 1986, Judge Frederick made findings on the record
and awarded Job a judgment against Calder in the sum of $55,000.
Between that date and January 30, 1986, Calder transferred
certain assets to his wife and brother.

He also amended his then

pending personal Chapter 13 bankruptcy to include Bailey but not
Job as a creditor.

Tr., 175; 400-403.

Importantly, Calder had not previously disclosed to Bailey,
Job or Judge Frederick that he had filed a personal Chapter 13 in
March 1984 which was still open and pending.

Calder had not

amended the Chapter 13 case to include Job as a creditor.

On

February 24, 1986, however, at the hearing to approve the form of
Judge Frederick's findings and to have the malpractice judgment
entered, Calder's counsel informed the court of his pending
Chapter 13 case and asserted for the first time in the
malpractice case that the automatic stay precluded the court from
entering the judgment.

Judge Frederick refused to stay the

proceedings at that point and entered the judgment.

Tr., 176;

Exhibit B-36.
Thereafter on March 12, 1986, Calder filed another Chapter
13 bankruptcy.

The 1984 Chapter 13 case was not yet closed.

In

that 1986 Chapter 13 filing, Calder listed assets significantly
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less than those listed in his 1984 Chapter 13.

Judge Allen

dismissed the March 1986 Chapter 13 filing as a bad faith filing
pursuant to a Motion to Dismiss filed by Job.

Job also moved to

dismiss the 1984 Chapter 13 as a bad faith filing and, again,
Judge Allen granted the Motion.

Calder filed appeals of those

decisions but did not post any supersedeas bond.
are now final and non-appealable.

The dismissals

Tr., 176-180; 747-750;

Exhibits B-37 and B-38.
In August of 1986, Calder filed a Chapter 7 in an effort to
preclude Job from executing on his judgment.

Job then sued

Calder in the Chapter 7 matter, requesting that Calder be denied
a discharge.

After a trial, on September 27, 1988, Judge Allen

issued a memorandum decision denying Calder a discharge and
finding by clear and convincing evidence that Calder had
knowingly and fraudulently prepared his schedules.

Calder then

filed an appeal of that decision and for the first time posted a
supersedeas bond to preclude Job from executing on the
malpractice judgment.2
C.

Tr., 179-180; 184; 789-790; Exhibit B-39.

Conclusion:

Based on Calder's conduct as outlined in the Findings of
Fact, the Panel concluded that Calder committed no less than

Denial of a discharge terminates the automatic stay and,
without the bond, Job would have been able to pursue collection
of the malpractice judgment.
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fifteen disciplinary rule violations including misrepresentation,
dishonesty, harassment of clients, conduct adversely reflecting
on fitness to practice, neglect, intentional failure to carry out
a contract of employment, intentional prejudice of a client's
interests, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,
and taking action in a legal matter to harass or injure.

See

Conclusions of Law 1 and 2 of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Recommendation of Discipline, pp. 15-20.
The Panel made additional findings in aggravation of that
sanction and found that Calder displayed a dishonest and selfish
motive in his attempts to cover his mishandling of the Job and
Bailey matter; that Calderfs conduct continued over a decade;
that Calder contradicted himself on many occasions to avoid
responsibility for his conduct; and that the clients were
particularly vulnerable since they were seeking assistance in
such a highly specialized area of law.

Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of Discipline, pp. 20-22.
Based on those myriad disciplinary rule violations and the
factors found in aggravation, the Panel recommended and the Board
affirmed that Calder should be disbarred from the practice of law
in the State of Utah.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Board of Bar Commissioners has recommended that J.
Richard Calder be disbarred from the practice of law in the State
of Utah.

That recommendation of disbarment is based on findings
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of fact and conclusions of law which are supported by substantial
evidence in the record.

Calder, however, attacks the finding for

several reasons.
First, Calder challenges the findings regarding his personal
bankruptcies, which were filed in 1984, March 1986 and August
1986, as being outside the scope of the underlying formal
complaints.

The formal complaints involving Larry Bailey (F-274)

and Dennis Job (F-253) were consolidated for purposes of the
disciplinary trial.

The formal complaint in F-253, in

particular, specifically alleges facts relative to Calder*s
personal bankruptcies.

The findings of the Panel with regard to

those personal bankruptcies are related either to Calderfs
misconduct with respect to Job and Bailey or factors pertinent to
the recommended sanction.

In any event, Calder did not object to

evidence and testimony regarding his personal bankruptcies and,
in fact, himself gave extensive testimony on those issues at the
trial.

Based on that, Calder has impliedly consented to the

trial on those issues.
Second, Calder claims that the findings with respect to the
Bailey matter (F-274) are flawed because they are based on a
misapprehension of § 48-21-15 of the Motor Vehicle Code.

That

code provision was not considered nor interpreted by the Panel in
reaching its findings and is irrelevant to the misconduct of
Calder.

Calder, assisting Bailey in amending his bankruptcy

schedules to include the omitted Harris judgment debt, relied on
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Bailey's representations that the Department of Motor Vehicles
would not renew his driver's license unless that judgment debt
was either satisfied or discharged in bankruptcy.

Never did

Calder advise Bailey that amending the schedules to include that
judgment debt would not enable him to renew his driver's license.
Indeed, Calder did not introduce evidence to that effect at the
disciplinary trial, nor did he raise the application of
§48-21-15.

He is now precluded from raising that issue.

Third, Calder asserts that the findings, conclusions and
recommendation are advisory only and that the findings are
erroneous.

The disciplinary case law fashioned by this Court

clearly sets forth that findings and recommendation of discipline
by the Board will be presumed to be correct unless a showing is
made that they are arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by
substantial evidence.

The findings in the instant case are based

on substantial and, oft times, uncontroverted, evidence in the
record.

That evidence is specifically noted in the discussion of

each particular finding infra.
Next, Calder suggests that the Panel erred by failing to
consider factors in mitigation when fashioning the sanction.

The

record is clear that the Panel took and considered evidence
relative to mitigation but found that no mitigating factors were
established by that evidence.

Calder's three factors in

mitigation, which he argues were erroneously excluded, presuppose
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that the Panel found its own findings to be erroneous.

The Panel

did not so find and did not err in excluding those factors in
mitigation.
Finally, Calder argues that the recommendation of disbarment
is disproportionate.

Disbarment is not disproportionate given

that Calder was found to have violated no less than fifteen (15)
disciplinary rules, that he generally has a selfish motive in
relation to his clients1 best interests and that he
misrepresented assets and in bad faith filed three (3) personal
bankruptcies.

The Panel also found that Calder is unable to

conform his conduct as a lawyer to even the minimum standards of
the profession.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE ISSUES TRIED BEFORE THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING PANEL WERE
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST CALDER
AND/OR WERE WITHIN THE IMPLIED SCOPE OF THE COMPLAINTS.
Calder complains that the circumstances surrounding his

personal bankruptcies - two Chapter 13 cases filed in 1984 and
1986 and a Chapter 7 case filed in 1986 - were beyond the scope
of the allegations raised in the two formal complaints.

That

argument ignores the fact that the allegations of the
consolidated formal complaint did, in fact, specifically allege
conduct related to Calder's personal bankruptcies; that the
evidence presented at trial without objection gives rise to an
amendment of the pleadings to conform to that evidence; and that
the evidence was relevant to Calderfs state of mind, to his
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credibility and the credibility of Job's and Bailey1s testimony,
to the issue of Calder1s competence, and to the issue of
sanctions.
A.

ALLEGATIONS OF THE FORMAL COMPLAINTS

Two formal complaints were filed against Calder:

F-274

filed October 23, 1987, as a result of an initial complaint by
Larry Bailey, and F-253 filed February 6, 1987, as a result of an
initial complaint by Dennis Job.

Those two formal complaints

were consolidated on October 4, 1988, for purposes of trial. See
Order of Consolidation dated October 4, 1988. The Bailey Formal
Complaint (F-274) alleged violations of no less than seven
disciplinary rules focusing on Calderfs failure to adequately
remedy the omission of a judgment debt in Bailey's original
bankruptcy filed in 1978 after Calder agreed in 1983 to undertake
3
further representation of Bailey for that purpose.
The Job Formal Complaint (F-253) alleged nine disciplinary
rule violations, seven of which are the identical to those

The disciplinary rule violations alleged in F-274 are
briefly as follows: (1) Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); (2)
Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(6) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness
to practice law); (3) Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5) (engaging in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); (4) Canon
6, DR 6-101(A)(2) (handling a legal matter without adequate
preparation); (5) Canon 6, DR 6-101(A)(3) (neglect); (6) Canon 7,
DR 7-101(A)(2) (intentionally failing to carry out a contract of
employment); and (7) Canon 7, DR 7-101(A)(3) (intentionally
prejudicing or damaging client's interest).
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alleged in the Bailey Formal Complaint ; the allegations in the
Job Formal Complaint focus on Calderfs failure to adequately
remedy the omission of an asset in Job's bankruptcy schedules.
In addition, the factual allegations in the Job Formal Complaint
specifically reference Calder's personal bankruptcies filed up to
1986 as those bankruptcies relate to his misconduct.
Formal Complaint, F-253, paragraphs d, e, g, h, i.

See Job

Those

allegations in pertinent part set forth (1) Calder's failure to
inform Job or Judge Frederick of his pending 1984 Chapter 13
bankruptcy until after Judge Frederick awarded Job a malpractice
judgment in the sum of $55,000; (2) Calder's transfer of assets
after Judge Frederick orally rendered the malpractice judgment
but prior to entry of the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment; (3)
Calder's second Chapter 13, filed on March 12, 1986 and its
subsequent dismissal for bad faith by Judge Allen; (4) the
dismissal of Calder's 1984 bankruptcy for bad faith; and (5)
Calder's filing of his Chapter 7 bankruptcy in August 19, 1986,
listing 900 of his clients as creditors.

At trial, Special Bar

Counsel produced evidence as to those enumerated factual
allegations and the relationship of that conduct to Job's and

The two additional rule violations are: (1) Canon 7, DR
7-101(A)(1) (intentionally failing to seek objectives of client)
and (2) Canon 7, DR 7-102(A)(1) (taking a position merely to
harass or injure).
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Baileyfs representation and the resulting disciplinary rule
violations.

The Formal Complaints clearly put Calder on adequate

notice both as to the nature and the scope of the issues.
B.

IMPLIED CONSENT TO AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS

Rule XII(b) of the Procedures of Discipline of the Utah
State Bar provide that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
evidence applicable to non-jury civil trials govern disciplinary
trials.

Consequently, Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure applies to the disciplinary trial conducted in the
instant case.

Rule 15(b) permits an implied amendment of

pleadings to conform to the evidence.

Further, in the context of

a disciplinary case, it has been held that Min the absence of any
objections to evidence on an issue raised by the pleadings, the
party failing to object has impliedly consented to the amendment
of the pleadings to conform to the evidence."
N.M. 10, 315 P.2d 837 (1972).

In Re Sedillo, 84

In Sedillo, the complaint failed

to allege the attorney's wrongful retention of money.

The

attorney offered no objection to the evidence offered on that
issue and cross-examined witnesses concerning the alleged
wrongful retention.
In the instant case, Calder participated in all five days of
trial over a two-month period; he offered only one objection to
all of the evidence concerning his personal bankruptcies.

That

objection was to the introduction of a Memorandum Decision and
Order dated September 27, 1988, wherein Judge Allen denied Calder
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a discharge for fraudulently omitting certain assets from his
bankruptcy schedules.

Exhibit B-39.

The Panel admitted the

Judge's Order noting that conduct of an attorney, which is part
of the total course of action of that attorney, may continue
after the filing of the complaint and as long as the evidence of
such conduct is directly related to the dispute complained of,
the evidence is admissible.

Tr., 181-183.

In his Appellant's Brief, Calder claims he is somehow
prejudiced by any implied consent to matters involving his
personal bankruptcies.

Yet the record reflects that not only did

he fail to object to the introduction of evidence relating to his
bankruptcies but he also chose not to engage in any discovery
prior to the trial.

Calder had ample opportunity to engage in

pre-trial discovery since the formal complaints had been pending
since February 19, 1987, and October 27, 1987.

Had he done so,

he could have discovered the specific evidence and arguments to
be introduced by the Office of Bar Counsel at trial.

In

addition, Calder in his own defense offered his own testimony and
cross-examined witnesses on the issue of his personal
bankruptcies.
Even at this juncture, Calder has not shown that he did not
have a "fair opportunity to defend" nor that he "could offer any
additional evidence if the case were to be retried on a different
theory."

Such a showing is required by the test cited by Calder
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at page 23 of Appellant's brief and as set forth at 3 MooreTs
Federal Practice, Section 15.13[2] at 15-131(1989)•
C.

EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO STATE OF MIND, CREDIBILITY AND
SANCTION

Finally, the evidence and findings with respect to Calderfs
personal bankruptcies are relevant for three (3) other reasons:
state of mind, credibility and sanctions.

First, as to state of

mind, Calderfs conduct in his own bankruptcies clearly evidenced
his conduct and attitude toward Job and Bailey as clients.
Calder's conduct in his personal bankruptcies impacted Job and
Bailey in their efforts to have Calder take responsibility for
his inadequate and incompetent representation of them in their
own bankruptcies.

For example, Calder did not attempt to have

Jobfs malpractice claims listed as liabilities in his pending
1984 Chapter 13 bankruptcy until after he knew Job was awarded a
5
substantial judgment of $55,000.00.
Calder then began to use
his personal bankruptcy proceedings to preclude Job from
executing on that judgment.

Calder first asked Judge Frederick

in the February 1986 hearing in the malpractice action to stay
further proceedings.

Judge Frederick refused.

Then on March 12,

1986, one month after the malpractice judgment, Calder filed a

Calder filed his Chapter 13 in March 1984; Job sued Calder
for malpractice in September 1984. Calder never raised an issue
about the automatic stay until February 1986 at the hearing on
entry of the malpractice judgment.
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second Chapter 13 to obtain an automatic stay; that Chapter 13
was dismissed as a bad faith filing.

In the meantime, Calder

appealed Judge Frederick's malpractice judgment to the Utah
Supreme Court.

This Court denied that appeal.

Calder then filed

a personal Chapter 7 on August 16, 1986; Judge Allen denied a
discharge in that Chapter 7 in September 1988.

Having exhausted

all other avenues of stopping execution on the Job malpractice
judgment, in November 1988, Calder posted a supersedeas bond of
$55,000 in connection with his appeal of the denial of discharge
in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

Tr., 176-180; 184; 747-750;

789-790; Exhibits B-37 through B-39.

From these actions, the

Panel could reasonably conclude that Calder was misusing the
bankruptcy process to avoid responsibility to a client.
Second, as to credibility, Calder?s carelessness and
incompetence in his own bankruptcies to properly list assets,
file the appropriate bankruptcy forms and properly use the
bankruptcy process supported the testimony of Job and Bailey that
Calder negligently and carelessly prepared and followed through
on their bankruptcies.

Where Calder was directly controverting

Job's and Bailey's testimony of his negligence and carelessness,
evidence that Calder was negligent and careless in his own
bankruptcies goes to establishing the credibility of Job's and
Bailey's testimony and was properly admitted by the Panel.
Finally, the findings of fact made by the Panel must support
not only the conclusions of law found by the Panel but must also
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support the enumerated factors relative to the recommended
sanction.

When a Panel considers factors relative to sanctions,

the Panel considers not only the offenses at issue but also
"matters independent of the specific offense but relevant to
fitness to practice.11
Sanctions, § 9.1.

ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer

The Findings of Fact with respect to Calder's

personal bankruptcies, in addition to proving the factual
allegations set forth in the formal complaints, support the
Panel's Factor No. 2 in Aggravation where the Panel found:
Respondent displayed a dishonest and selfish motive in his
attempts to cover his inappropriate handling of both the Job
and Bailey bankruptcies by filing several personal
bankruptcies in bad faith,... by filing inappropriate asset
schedules, and in doing so perpetrated fraud, engaged in
misrepresentations and in misleading conduct with the courts
and his clients.
See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of
Discipline, p. 21.
In addition, the conclusions of law that relate to Calderfs
personal bankruptcies are conclusions which relate directly to
the claims of Bailey and Job; they are not independent of those
issues.

See Conclusions of Law Nos. l.b, d, i and 2b.

Those

paragraphs set forth the Panel's conclusions that Calder's
conduct in his personal bankruptcies was intended to harass
and/or injure Job and/or Bailey.

While Conclusion of Law No. lc

does not specifically relate to Job or Bailey, it does support
aggravating factor No. 2 in that it concludes that Calder's
filing of disparate asset schedules in his bankruptcies
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constituted dishonesty and fraud.

That factor clearly goes to

Calder's general fitness to practice which is relevant in
determining a sanction as previously noted.
D.

SUMMARY

Calder1s conduct in his personal bankruptcies was
inextricably connected with the factual allegations and
disciplinary rule violations set forth in the consolidated Job
and Bailey formal complaints.

Calder defended himself at trial

without objection to the evidence of his personal bankruptcies.
That evidence was admitted to establish Calder's general standard
of practice in filing bankruptcy schedules and to establish the
credibility of Job's and Bailey's testimony that Calder was
negligent in filing their bankruptcies just as he was negligent
in filing his own.

Finally, the Panel appropriately considered

Calder's conduct with regard to his personal bankruptcies in
reviewing evidence relevant to mitigating and aggravating factors
to determine an appropriate sanction pursuant to ABA guidelines.
II.

THE APPLICATION OF § 41-12-15 OF THE UTAH MOTOR VEHICLE ACT
IS IRRELEVANT TO THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE PANEL
AND TO THE NATURE OF CALDERfS MISCONDUCT.
Calder argues that the Panel misapprehended the application

of § 41-12-15 of the Utah Motor Vehicle Act with respect to the
findings on the Bailey matter.

The Panel with regard to the

Bailey formal complaint, F-274, found the following:

that Calder

omitted a judgment debt from Bailey's bankruptcy schedules; that
Bailey informed Calder that the Department of Motor Vehicles had
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denied him a driver's license because that judgment debt appeared
on his record; that, thereafter, Calder wrote to the Department
of Motor Vehicles to clear the matter and ultimately agreed to
assist Bailey in amending his bankruptcy schedules to include the
omitted judgment debt; and that, in fact, Bailey was unable to
obtain a drivers license. See Finding No. 1, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of Discipline.
At the outset, it should be noted that the above facts as
found by the Panel are uncontroverted.

At the disciplinary trial

Calder offered no evidence to refute the fact that Bailey came to
him unable to renew his driver's license or that Bailey was
informed by the Department of Motor Vehicles that the outstanding
judgment precluded him from obtaining a driver's license.

In

fact, Calder acknowledged that Bailey initially came to him
because of the driver's license problem.

The receipt which

Calder's office gave Bailey for the $10.00 payment in furtherance
of Calder's agreement to amend the bankruptcy schedules noted
that it was for the driver's license problem.

Tr., 467; Exhibit

B-13.
Calder did not offer into evidence the 1979 version of
§ 41-12-15 of the Utah Motor Vehicles Act.

He never contested

the testimony by Bailey and the conclusions argued therefrom:
that, in fact, the Department of Motor Vehicles had refused to
renew Bailey's driver's license because he had a judgment debt on
his record, which did not appear as being satisfied or discharged
in bankruptcy.
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Calderfs uncontroverted conduct belies the very argument and
interpretation of § 41-12-15 which he presses for the first time
on appeal.

When initially informed by Bailey in 1979 that he had

been denied a driver's license because the Harris judgment debt
remained on his record, Calder did not advise Bailey that even if
the Harris judgment debt were discharged in bankruptcy, that
discharge would not relieve Bailey from satisfying the judgment
in order to renew his license.

Such advice would have been

consistent with Calderfs present interpretation of § 41-12-15.
Instead, Calder agreed that the discharge in bankruptcy would
correct the problem and, in fact, Calder wrote a letter to the
Department of Motor Vehicles informing them of the bankruptcy and
of the discharge so that Bailey could renew his driver's license.
Calder also took some initial steps to amend Bailey's schedules.
If these efforts would have been to no avail in light of
§ 41-12-15, then why was Calder doing them?

Obviously, either

Calder did not understand the law, which is relevant in a
disciplinary proceeding, or the statute was not being enforced by
the Department because it was unconstitutional.

Exhibit B-4.

In fact, § 41-12-15 was found to be unconstitutional and
was amended. Undoubtedly, its unconstitutionality was
understood, based upon the case of Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S.
637 (1971) and was not applied as written. This clearly accounts
for Calder's conduct in 1979 and 1982/1983, prior to the
amendment, as consistent with the understanding that, in fact, a
(Footnote Continued)
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Subsequently, upon Bailey discovering the debt was not
listed in his bankruptcy schedules and still being unable to
renew his driver's license, Bailey went back to Calder for
further assistance.

Receiving no satisfaction, Bailey complained

to the Utah State Bar.

Calder ultimately agreed to further

assist Bailey in amending his bankruptcy schedule to include the
omitted debt.

At that time, Calder knew that the reason Bailey

believed he needed the debt included in his schedules was to
renew his driver's license.

Calder then took steps to have

Bailey's bankruptcy schedules amended.

He did not at anytime

advise Bailey that discharging the debt was useless in attempting
to renew his license.

Tr., 37-38; 43; 48-51; 121-128; 315;

324-326; 467; Exhibit B-13.
In any event, the interpretation of the 1979 version of
§ 41-12-15 is irrelevant to Calder's misconduct.

If, in fact,

amending the bankruptcy schedules to include the discharge of the
Harris debt would not enable Bailey to renew his driver's
license, Calder's minimum obligation was to so advise him so
Bailey could take other appropriate steps to renew his driver's
license.

Instead, Calder agreed to represent Bailey in amending

(Footnote Continued)
debt discharged in bankruptcy satisfied an outstanding judgment
for purposes of the Department of Motor Vehicles. Calder knew
that § 41-12-15 was not being applied by the Department as he now
argues, at least at the time of the Bailey malpractice action.
See Affidavits at App. I.
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the schedules and failed, as found by the Panel.

The Panel's

conclusion that Bailey was unable to obtain his driver's license
because of Calder's misconduct is absolutely correct and
uncontroverted, no matter how § 41-12-15 is interpreted or
applied.
III. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR
UNREASONABLE AND ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Calder cites several disciplinary cases for the proposition
that the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation
of Discipline are merely advisory and should be accorded little
of the deference normally accorded findings from other agencies
or tribunals.

That assertion is a serious misreading of prior

disciplinary opinions from this Court.
This Court has consistently upheld findings of fact and
conclusions of law in disciplinary cases absent a showing that
such findings or conclusions are arbitrary, capricious,
unreasonable or not supported by substantial evidence.

See,

e.g., In Re Robert B. Hansen, 584 P.2d 805 (Utah 1978); In Re
Johnston, 524 P.2d 593 (Utah 1974); In Re Badger, 27 Utah 2d 174,
493 P.2d 1273 (1972); In Re Fullmer, 17 Utah 2d 121, 405 P.2d 343
(1965); In Re Macfarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631 (1960).
Though this Court has acknowledged the Court's ultimate
authority in the discipline of attorneys, this Court has not
exercised that authority in an arbitrary or inconsistent manner.
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Rather, this Court has consistently applied sound principles of
appellate review as is clearly stated in In Re Johnston:
We are aware that the action of the Bar
Commission is but a recommendation to this
court... Nevertheless, this Court has
declared and reiterated that in considering
the findings and recommendations of the
Committee, the Court will indulge them
with presumption of correctness and
propriety; and will not disregard or
overturn them unless something is
made to appear to persuade the court
that the Commission has acted capriciously,
arbitrarily or beyond the scope of its
powers.
In Re Johnston, 524 P.2d at 594.

(emphasis added).

This Court has taken somewhat more latitude in reviewing the
recommended sanction as opposed to the findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

On limited occasions the Court has changed

the recommended discipline without disturbing the findings of
fact or conclusions of law.
supra, 584 P.2d 805.

See, e.g., In Re Robert B. Hansen,

Still, in those instances, the Court has

articulated the rule that the Board's recommendation will be
accepted unless arbitrary or capricious.

In Re Fullmer, supra,

405 P.2d 343.
Appellant cites In Re McCune, 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986), for
the proposition that the findings are merely advisory and not
entitled to any particular deference.

Appellant misreads In Re

McCune, however, by greatly expanding two sentences of dicta at
the conclusion of the opinion.
709.

See In Re McCune, 717 P.2d at

The Court in McCune acknowledges that the Utah Supreme
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Court is the body which imposes and authorizes the public
discipline of attorneys.

From that, the Court in McCune simply

noted that a recommendation of public discipline by the Bar
Commission is not final until reviewed and entered by this Court.
McCune did not establish or reestablish the standard of review in
appeals of disciplinary cases as being merely advisory; in fact,
the Court in McCune does not even address the issue of the
standard of review for findings of fact and conclusions of law in
disciplinary cases.
To adopt Calder's suggested standard of review would make
meaningless the considerable effort and time spent by
disciplinary hearing panels and the Bar Commission.

Such a

standard of review would encourage attorneys to appeal every
decision of a disciplinary hearing panel since the attorney could
in every instance reargue his characterization of the evidence on
appeal.

That would make this Court's ability to review a matter

on the record an almost impossible task.
In this instance, Calder asserts such a standard of review
for that very reason:

so that by this appeal, Calder can simply

reargue his characterization of the evidence.

Calderfs primary

attack on the Panel's and the Bar Commission's findings is that
they rejected his characterization of the facts.

Calder's

Statement of the Case and his many references to the record are
primarily citations to his own testimony, which are for the most
part characterization and conclusions.
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His other references to

the record are merely citations to evidence that supports his
characterization of the evidence.

Such an approach shifts the

burden on appeal to the Bar to marshall the evidence and show
that the record does in fact support the findings.
On appeal, a lower tribunal's or agency's decision should
have the presumption of validity and correctness absent some
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness.

In the instant case,

Calder is unable to show that the findings are arbitrary or
capricious.

Consequently, Calder is left to merely reargue his

characterization of the evidence,

a characterization which the

Panel rejected.
IV.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
IN THE RECORD, EVIDENCE WHICH CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY
SUPPORTS THE PANEL'S RECOMMENDATION OF DISBARMENT.
A.

MANY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE BASED ON
UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE OR ON THE CLEAR, UNCONTROVERTED
CONDUCT OF CALDER.

Calder makes a sweeping argument that the findings of fact
with respect to the Bailey Formal Complaint (F-253) were
determined largely by balancing Calder's testimony against
others' testimony or by the Panel admitting hearsay evidence,
which hearsay evidence does not meet the Bar's burden of
establishing its allegations by clear and convincing evidence.
That argument is simply not supported by the record.

Many of the

Panel's Findings of Fact with respect to the Bailey Formal
Complaint (F-274) are uncontroverted and largely based on
Calder's own uncontroverted conduct.
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The events and

circumstances of Calderfs misconduct were established not only by
testimony but by documentary evidence.
Calder's testimony conflicts with Paoletti's testimony as to
the nature of Calderfs agreement to continue representing Bailey.
Though Calder now insists that he volunteered to assist Bailey in
amending his bankruptcy schedules to include the omitted Harris
judgment debt, in a 1983 affidavit filed in the Bailey
malpractice action, Calder stated that he assisted Bailey at the
request of Bar Counsel.

Exhibit B-26.

Paoletti testified that

after conversing with both Calder and Bailey, Calder agreed to
represent Bailey and agreed to go forward for a lump sum payment
of $10.00.

Tr., p. 121.

In this instance, the Panel determined

the credibility of testimony by weighing all the evidence, which
it is entitled to do, including Calder?s uncontroverted conduct.
Calder did in fact undertake to amend Bailey's bankruptcy
schedules-; Calder initially accepted $10.00 from Bailey in
furtherance of that objective; and Calder did in fact file
pleadings, though inadequate, after accepting the second sum of
$15.00 from Bailey.

Tr., 45-51; 121-128; 315; 324-326; 335;

Exhibits B-12; B-13; B-17; B-19 and B-20.

What Calder attempted

to controvert through his testimony is uncontroverted by his own
actions.

It is the Panel's duty to consider all the facts; it is

not bound by Calderfs characterizations.
In asserting that Paoletti's testimony should not have been
accepted as credible, Calder emphasizes one part of Paoletti's
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testimony where Paoletti stated he did not have a clear
recollection of all of the events.
taken out of context.

Tr., 121. That testimony is

Paoletti made that statement in response

to a specific question about how he became aware of Bailey's
complaint against Calder.

In response to that question, Paoletti

frankly testified that he did not have a clear recollection as to
whether the complaint was made by Bailey personally coming to the
office or by a written letter initially.

Tr., 121.

Paoletti

never testified that he did not have a clear recollection as to
all the events and occurrences.

Paoletti testified to the facts

and events he remembered and noted when his recollection was not
clear.

See, e.g., Tr., 122.

Consequently, the Panel clearly

knew when Paolettifs testimony was based on a clear recollection
of the circumstances and when it was not.
The Panel simply rejected Calderfs characterization of the
facts and events relative to his agreement to amend Bailey's
bankruptcy schedules.

The Panel was not bound by Calder's

characterizations no matter how clearly he articulated them
during the course of his testimony.
In further attacking the findings with respect to the Bailey
matter, Calder asserts that the Panel's finding that Bailey could
not renew his driver's license is flawed.

Calder argues that the

finding is based on hearsay evidence. The fact that Bailey could
not and did not renew his driver's license is uncontroverted.
Calder did not introduce evidence, advance any argument or refute
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the assertion that Bailey's inability to renew his driver's
license was attributable to a circumstances other than the
undischarged judgment debt.
Assuming, arguendo, however, that Bailey's testimony
regarding the Department of Motor Vehicles' refusal to renew his
license was hearsay, under the Rules of evidence, hearsay is not
7
inadmissible per se.
The Panel was entitled to consider the
trustworthiness of the evidence and give it appropriate weight in
making its findings.
Panel did so.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(24).

The

The Panel accepted the testimony under the

following circumstances:

Calder made no objection to that

portion of Bailey's testimony; no evidence was advanced by Calder
to controvert it; Calderfs own testimony at trial did not refute
Bailey's testimony that he was unable to renew his driver's
license; and Calder attempted to assist Bailey in amending the
bankruptcy schedules when Calder knew that the reason Bailey
wanted his bankruptcy schedules amended was so that he could
renew his driver's license.
For the most part, the evidence underlying the Panel's
findings of fact with respect to the Bailey Formal Complaint is

The case cited by Calder for the proposition that hearsay
is inadmissible is a 1957 case and does not take into account the
new rules of evidence and their approach to hearsay. See Utah
Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 et. seq.
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uncontroverted, and certainly is clear and convincing.

Calder

has failed to show that the Panel's admission of evidence or
reliance on certain evidence in making its findings was
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.

Calder has also not shown

that the findings with respect to F-253 are unsupported by
substantial evidence in the record.

Again, Calderfs arguments

rest solely on the fact that the Panel rejected Calder's
subjective characterization of the facts.
B.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD.

Calder appropriately acknowledged his duty on appeal to
marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then to
demonstrate that the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the factual determinations, is insufficient to
support the findings.

See generally, Harline v. Campbell, 720

P.2d 980 (Utah 1986).

Although acknowledging that duty, Calder

fails to marshall the evidence and, in many instances, does not
even give the appearance of attempting to do so.

In attacking

each of the findings, Calder either does not cite to all the
supporting evidence in the record or merely complains that his
characterization of the facts was rejected without disputing the
actual facts.

Calder then merely reargues the evidence and/or

recrafts the finding and attacks the recrafted finding.

Calder's

arguments suggest that the Panel was bound by Calderfs subjective
characterizations as set out in Calderfs trial testimony, and
that, by not accepting those characterizations or at least
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acknowledging them in the findings, the Panel erred.

As will be

shown, the findings are amply supported by substantial evidence
in the record.
1.

Finding No. 1(a);
Mr. Bailey originally retained Respondent to file a
bankruptcy in 1978. Problems arose in this bankruptcy
respecting the discharge of a certain judgment debt which
precluded Mr. Bailey from obtaining a Utah driverfs license.
Calder claims that the only evidence supporting this finding

is a brief excerpt from Bailey's trial testimony and that the
finding is based solely on hearsay evidence.

In fact, Bailey's

uncontroverted testimony was that in 1979, when he was initially
unable to renew his driver's license, he informed Calder that he
needed proof of the judgment debt being discharged so he could
renew his driver's license. Tr., 35-37.
that Bailey so informed him.

Calder admitted at trial

Tr., 307. At that time, and

without actually checking the bankruptcy schedules, Calder wrote
a letter to the Department of Motor Vehicles indicating that the
judgment debt had been discharged.

Tr, 307-308; Exhibit B-4.

The Department would not accept the letter.

Bailey obtained the

bankruptcy pleadings at which time he discovered that the
judgment debt was not listed in the bankruptcy schedules. Tr.,
37-41.

Consequently, Bailey went back to Calder to have him

amend the schedules.

Tr., 37-41, 307-311.

Calder himself

acknowledged those events and acknowledged his own efforts to
amend Bailey's bankruptcy schedules so that the judgment debt
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could be discharged and Bailey could renew his driver's license.
Tr., 307-311.

In fact, the receipt Calder gave to Bailey for his

payment of $10.00 recites that the payment is for the driver's
license problem.

Exhibit B-13.

The fact that Bailey was unable

to renew his driver's license is absolutely uncontroverted.
Further, Calder did not object at the time of trial to
Bailey's testimony that he was unable renew his driver's license
as hearsay nor did Calder introduce any evidence that Bailey's
inability to obtain his driver's license was due to any fact
other than the omission of the judgment debt from Bailey's
bankruptcy schedules.

As previously noted, Calder's own conduct

in writing a letter to the Department of Motor Vehicles and in
subsequently attempting to amend the bankruptcy schedules was a
result of Calder knowing that Bailey could not renew his driver's
license otherwise.

Tr., 300-311; Exhibit B-13.

The record is

absolutely cleai that everyone, including Calder, proceeded to
amend the bankruptcy schedules based on Bailey's need to have the
judgment debt discharged in his bankruptcy case to renew his
license.

Calder's conduct supports that finding; Bailey's

conduct supports that finding.

In fact, Calder never advised

Bailey that discharging the judgment debt would not enable him to
renew his driver's license.

Rather, Calder agreed to represent

him in amending the bankruptcy schedules for that purpose.
Finding 1(a) is supported by substantial, uncontroverted
evidence in the record.
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2.

Finding No, 1(b):
In or about October 1983, Respondent entered into an
engagement with Mr. Bailey, arranged through Bar Counsel, C.
Jeffrey Paoletti, to resolve an investigation of a
disciplinary complaint filed by Mr. Bailey against
Respondent. By this engagement, Respondent agreed that he
would obtain an amendment to Mr. Bailey's bankruptcy
schedules and obtain a discharge for Mr. Bailey of a
judgment debt owed by Mr. Bailey to Richard D. and Morren C.
Harris in the sum of about $1,400.00.
Calder's challenge to this finding is simply an attempt to

reargue and recharacterize the evidence.

He first argues that he

did not enter into an agreement to represent Bailey in amending
his bankruptcy schedules but that he "volunteered" to do so.
Whether Calder "volunteered" to assist Bailejy is totally
irrelevant.

The facts are that Calder agreed to assist Bailey in

amending his bankruptcy schedules; he filed a legal pleading as
Bailey's attorney to effect that amendment; and he accepted money
from Bailey for the purpose of obtaining that amendment.
43-51; 121-126; Exhibits B-13 and B-17.

Tr.,

Calder's undertaking was

in fact arranged through Bar Counsel, C. Jeffrey Paoletti.
Paoletti testified that he had conversations with Calder and
Bailey; Bailey did not contact Calder nor did Calder contact
Bailey until after the arrangements were made through Paoletti.
Tr., 122-125.

Contrary to what Calder now argues, in the 1983

affidavit filed in the Bailey malpractice lawsuit, Calder
admitted that he undertook Bailey's representation at the behest
of the Utah State Bar through Bar Counsel.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 38

Exhibit B-26.

This Finding is accurate, uncontroverted and supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
3.

Finding No. 1(c):
Respondent agreed to complete the engagement and achieve the
objective upon Mr. Bailey's paying $10.00 for additional
attorney's fees; Mr. Bailey made said payment of $10.00 to
Respondent.
In subjectively characterizing the evidence relating to this

finding at trial, Calder asserted that he did not agree to go
forward based on a payment of $10.00.

However, Calder's own

conduct belies that characterization.

Calder chooses to ignore

this conduct in his discussion of this finding at Appellant's
Brief, pages 38-39.
Calder accepted the $10.00 from Bailey; he did not request
additional fees before proceeding and he in fact prepared the
amendment after receiving the $10.00.

Tr., 46; 49.

Then, on

November 28, 1983, Calder wrote to Bailey advising him to come to
the office and sign an amendment to the bankruptcy schedules.
Calder did not disclose in that letter that he needed additional
fees to go forward.

Tr., 319; Exhibit B-14.

Thereafter, Calder

discovered that the case was closed and the bankruptcy file sent
to Denver, Colorado.

Calder then contacted Bailey and informed

him that he would not proceed further without additional fees.
Tr., 48-50; Exhibit B-16.

Bailey contacted Paoletti and

complained that Calder was not completing the agreement and was
changing the deal.

Ultimately, Calder agreed to proceed for an

additional lump sum payment of $15.00.
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Tr., 50-51; 124-125.

Calder?s conduct amply supports the Panel's finding as does
Bailey's and Paoletti's testimony.

The only dispute with this

finding is that Calder would have the Panel, and now this Court,
characterize the evidence differently.
4.

Finding No. 1(d):
After accepting the engagement and agreeing upon the
fee to be charged, Respondent demanded additional money from
Mr. Bailey, in the amount of $120.00, in order to initiate
the engagement. Mr. Bailey complained to Mr. Paoletti about
this additional fee.
The evidence with respect to this finding is also

uncontroverted.

Calder accepted payment of $10.00 from Bailey

and prepared the Motion to Amend.

Calder obtained Bailey's

signature on the Motion and intended to file it, until he
discovered that the bankruptcy case was closed.
124-125.

Tr., 48-50;

In fact, Calder then demanded an additional $120.00.

Tr., 50; Exhibit B-16.

Bailey complained again to Paoletti.

Tr., 50-51; 124.
Calder simply reargues the evidence and objects to the
"apparent implication" of the finding that Calder acted
improperly in demanding additional money from Bailey.
Appellant's Brief, p. 41. The finding itself implies nothing; it
merely sets forth the facts as supported by substantial,
uncontroverted evidence in the record.
5.

Finding No. 1(e):
Subsequent to the October 1983 engagement, numerous
communications were exchanged between Mr. Bailey and
Respondent, and between Respondent and Bar Counsel which
concluded with Respondent reaffirming his agreement to
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continue representing Mr. Bailey in amending the bankruptcy
schedules. Mr. Bailey paid an additional $15.00 to
Respondent, at Respondent's reguest, in furtherance of the
engagement.
Calder does not argue that the facts in finding No. 1(e) are
erroneous but rather that the finding is "misleading" because it
fails to include his subjective characterization of the evidence.
Appellant's Brief at p. 41. Again, the facts in this finding are
undisputed.

After demanding the additional $120.00, Bailey and

Paoletti had two conversations.

Tr., 50-52.

Then, Paoletti and

Calder had a conversation, with "the resolution at the end of
that conversation [being] that [Calder] was to take an additional
$15.00."

Tr., 125.

In fact, on or about December 29, 1983,

Calder did accept an additional $15.00 from Bailey.
Exhibit B-17.

Tr., 51-52;

On or about January 12, 1984, Calder, as Bailey's

counsel, filed a Motion to Reopen Bailey's Chapter 7.
B-18.

Exhibit

Neither at the time he accepted the additional $15.00 from

Bailey nor thereafter did Calder raise the issue of additional
attorney's fees.

Instead, he proceeded with the representation.

Tr., 51-52; Exhibit B-18; Exhibit B-19; Exhibit B-20.
The facts are clear, uncontroverted and amply support the
Panel's finding.

The Panel did not err by failing to include

Calder's characterization of the evidence.
6.

Finding No. 1(g):
Though Respondent presented conflicting evidence as to
the agreement, the Panel accepted former Bar Counsel C.
Jeffrey Paoletti's testimony as the most credible evidence
of Respondent's agreement to represent Mr. Bailey in
amending his Bankruptcy.
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Calder asserts that the Panel erred by accepting Paoletti's
testimony as the most credible evidence; in doing so,

Calder

mischaracterizes and takes out of context Paolettifs statement
that he did not have a clear recollection.

Paoletti's statement

at trial that he did not have a clear recollection was, as
previously noted, in response to the specific question as to how
Bailey's complaint came to his attention.

Tr., 126.

Paoletti's

testimony as to the Calderfs agreement, however, is not
contradictory.

Paoletti's testimony is consistent with Bailey's

testimony as to the terms of that agreement and amply supports
the finding.

Tr., 121-128.

As further evidence of Paoletti's

credibility, Paoletti's understanding of the agreement was
memorialized in a contemporaneous letter to Bailey on October 19,
1983, wherein Paoletti states:
Mr. Calder did indicate that upon payment of $10, he
would proceed with the amendment of your schedules and
final resolution of this matter.
Exhibit B-12.

Finally, Calderfs own conduct is consistent with

Paolettifs version of the agreement.
The Panel's duty as the trier of fact is to determine
credibility.

The Panel heard the testimony, observed the

witnesses and had the opportunity to assess demeanor.

Taking

Paoletti's and Bailey's testimony as a whole along with the
documentary evidence, it cannot be said that the Panel erred in
accepting Paoletti's testimony as the most credible evidence of
Calder's agreement.

Paoletti was the only independent witness;
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he did not have a vested interest in the outcome of his
testimony.
7.

This finding is neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Finding No. 1(h):
Respondent filed a Motion to Reopen Mr. Bailey1s case, but
the Motion was inadequate on its face.
This finding is wholly supported by the record and the facts

admitted by Calder at the disciplinary trial. Calder admitted
that the Motion to Reopen was not sufficient to accomplish an
amendment of the bankruptcy schedules. Tr., 529-530.

That was

certainly born true by the Judge's sua sponte denial of the
Motion to Reopen.

Exhibit B-19.

Calder argues that the finding is erroneous because it fails
to "mention . . . the justification advanced by Calder."
Appellant's Brief, p. 42. The Panel is not required to accept or
set forth Calderfs "justification."

The uncontroverted

circumstances supporting this finding are clear from the record:
Calder admittedly filed a Motion to Reopen that was inadequate;
Calder did not inform the court on the face of the pleading that
it would be supplemented nor request additional time to
supplement the pleading, Tr., 529-530; Exhibit B-18; Calder
received the court's order denying the Motion but made no attempt
to have the denial set aside so he could submit the additional
information for which he claimed he was waiting; instead, Calder
immediately withdrew as Bailey's counsel.
52-54.

Exhibit B-20; Tr.,

In fact, Bailey learned of the Judge's decision not from

Calder but from the court.
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Tr., 52-54.

Calder further argues that this finding "cannot support the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions."

Appellant's Brief, p. 42.

The Panel did not base any conclusion of law nor the sanction on
this finding alone.

The Panel's recommendation is based upon all

of the findings, including this finding, and the conclusions, as
a whole, as well as the aggravating factors.
8.

Finding No. l(i):
After filing the Motion with the Bankruptcy Court,
Respondent failed to follow through with his representation
of Mr. Bailey by failing to schedule the Motion to Reopen
for hearing and by failing to present the Motion to the
judge for consideration.
Calder does not attack this finding as being erroneous or

arbitrary or unsupported by the evidence.

The finding as stated

is accurate and supported by the evidence in the record.

See

Tr., 53-55; 334-335; 529-530. Once again, Calder objects to the
finding because the Panel did not include Calder's subjective
characterization of these uncontroverted facts.

To argue,

however, that because subsequent counsel was able to accomplish
the discharge of the debt Calder was relieved of his
responsibility begs the question.

Calder1s misconduct was that

he undertook to amend the bankruptcy schedules, did so
incompetently, without due diligence and in a neglectful manner,
which required Bailey to hire subsequent counsel.

Subsequent

counsel's ability to have the judgment debt discharged actually
aggravates Calder's conduct; it is not mitigating.
Conclusions of Law No. 1(f) and (g).
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See

9.

Finding No. l(j):
The Motion to Reopen was denied, and, immediately upon
learning of the Court's order, Respondent withdrew from
representing Mr. Bailey. At no time after February 16,
1984, did Respondent make any effort to obtain substitute
counsel for Bailey, return the $10.00 paid by Bailey, refund
any portion of the original attorney's fees and costs paid
by Bailey for the Chapter 7, take any steps with the
Department of Motor Vehicles to assist Bailey obtain a
driver's license or, in any other way, assist Bailey in
achieving the desired objective.
On the whole, this finding is based on uncontroverted facts

set forth in the record.

Calder did withdraw immediately upon

learning of the court's order denying the Motion to Reopen; the
denial was issued February 15, 1984 and Calder withdrew on
February 16, 1984.

Exhibits B-19 and B-20.

As the finding

correctly states, Calder made no further effort to ensure that
his client's interests were protected.

Tr., 335.

Calder did not

obtain the amendment and did nothing to help Bailey renew his
driver's license.

Tr., 56; 335.

These facts are uncontested.

What Calder argues, then and now, and what the Panel
rejected, was that Bailey had the responsibility to contact
Calder upon his withdrawal to seek further assistance for
substitute counsel and/or to seek a return of the fees.
Appellant's Brief at p. 44. What the Panel appropriately
concluded from those facts and circumstances was that Calder
withdrew from representation in violation of DR 7-101(A)(2) and
(3).

Conclusions of Law No. l.g.
Finally, Calder asserts that no duty to refund fees could

have arisen "because Calder unilaterally volunteered to assist
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Bailey."

That position, as previously asserted, however, is

absolutely contradicted by Calder's own affidavit prepared and
filed in the Bailey malpractice lawsuit.

Exhibit B-26.

Once

again, Calder is merely attempting to reargue the evidence and in
doing so asserts contradictory characterizations of the
uncontroverted facts.
This finding is supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
10.

Finding No. l(k):
On or about April 16, 1984, Respondent, being under oath,
prepared, signed and filed an affidavit in the case of
Bailey v. Calder, Civil No. C85-80Q, then pending in the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, wherein Respondent knowingly and intentionally made
the following misrepresentations and false statements.
1) That after Judge Mabey had originally
granted an application to reopen Mr. Bailey's case, the
client was "to pay a $60.00 filing fee to the court and
also a $10.00 fee to add the creditor that he had
omitted, when, in fact, there was no such financial
arrangement at that time;
2) That after 1979, Respondent had not had
any contact with Bailey until 1982 when, in fact Bailey
had contacted Respondent on several occasions prior to
that date;
3) That Respondent did not represent Bailey
as his attorney in 1982 inasmuch as Bailey had refused
to pay anything to Respondent as requested, when, in
fact, Respondent had written to Bailey in 1982 advising
Bailey that Respondent was proceeding with his case;
4) That he had agreed to help Mr. Bailey in
1983 at the request of the Utah State Bar but that
nothing more was done because Bailey refused to pay
money when, in fact, Bailey had paid, in full, all the
money requested pursuant to the agreement;
5) That in 1983 he was not representing Mr.
Bailey because Bailey had not paid his retainer fee and
had "paid no money to [him]" when, in fact, Bailey had
paid all fees required under the agreement; and
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6) That at no time after 1978 had Respondent
represented Bailey in any bankruptcy matters, when, in
fact, he had represented Bailey, had advised Bailey
about bankruptcy matters, and had filed motions for
Bailey as Bailey's attorney both in 1979 and in 1984,
The only portions of this finding which Calder attacks are
subparagraphs (3), (4) and (5). The particular objections raised
by Calder are minuscule, attempting once again to recharacterize
the evidence-

Calder ignores all the circumstances and

contradicts his own conduct.
First, Calderfs assertion that no evidence exists to support
the finding that Calderfs conduct was knowing and intentional
clearly indicates that Calder has not made a good faith attempt
to marshall all the evidence in the record that supports this
particular finding.

Calder's knowledge of facts that clearly are

contrary to the statements made in his 1983 affidavit is amply
demonstrated by the documentary evidence received by the Panel.
In subparagraph (3) the Panel finds that, though Calder
claimed he did not represent Bailey in 1982, he did in fact
represent Bailey and he knew it.

That is clearly evidenced by

the letter from Calder to Bailey dated January 26, 1982, wherein
Calder acknowledges to Bailey that he is continuing on his behalf
and proceeding with his case.

Calder states:

"This letter is to

inform you that we are working on the matter in as speedy a
fashion as the mail will allow."

Exhibit B-ll.

affidavit Calder states the opposite.
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In his 1983

In subparagraph (4) the Panel finds that Calder
misrepresented the facts in his 1983 affidavit by claiming that
he did nothing further for Bailey because Bailey refused to pay
additional money.

Again, Calder knew that he accepted an initial

$10.00 from Bailey, another $15.00 on December 29, 1983, never
asking for additional fees thereafter.

Exhibits B-13 and B-17.

After payment of the $15.00, Calder proceeded on Bailey's behalf
by filing the Motion to Reopen on January 12, 1984.

Exhibit

B-18.
In subparagraph (5) the Panel again finds that Calder's
assertion that he did not represent Bailey in 1983 is belied by
his own conduct and by the relevant documentation.

Calder

prepared a Motion to Reopen and requested that Bailey come to his
office to sign it.

Exhibit B-16.

Calder then filed that Motion

on January 12, 1984, as Bailey's attorney.

Exhibit B-18.

On

February 16, 1984, Calder also gave Bailey written notification
that he was terminating his representation.

Exhibit B-20.

Calder did not assert he was terminating representation because
Bailey did not pay his fee but because Calder found Bailey to be
offensive.

Exhibit B-20.

All of this supports the conclusion

that Calder represented Bailey.
From the above facts and circumstances, the Panel inferred
that Calder knew the correct facts when he prepared and filed his
1983 affidavit and that the false statements in his affidavit
were intentional.

Inferring intent and state of mind from the

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 48

circumstances is appropriate as there is often little direct
evidence as to intent.

See, e.g., West Virginia State Bar v.

Douglas, 370 S.E.2d 325 (W. Va. 1988).
In attacking this finding, Calder does not marshall the
evidence in support of the finding but, again and again, simply
reasserts his characterization of the evidence and then points to
evidence which supports his characterization.

To the extent such

a tactic suggests that the record does not support the finding,
it is misleading.

As the prior discussion points out, the

Panel's finding is not merely supported by substantial evidence
in the record but is supported by uncontroverted evidence.
11.

Finding No. l(m):
When Respondent filed a personal Chapter 13 on February 23,
1984, he did not list Bailey as a creditor even though, at
that time, Respondent knew that he was required to list all
known and contingent liabilities and also knew that Bailey
probably had a claim against him for his failure to comply
with the terms of his agreement to achieve the desired
objective. Respondent did not seek to amend his 1984
Chapter 13 to add Bailey as a creditor until January 31,
1986, even though, as early as February 1985 Respondent knew
that Bailey had filed a malpractice action against him in
the Third Judicial District Court, Civil NO. C85-800.
The only portion of this finding objected to by Calder is

that Calder "knew that Bailey probably had a claim against him,"
which should have been listed in Calderfs personal Chapter 13
filed on February 23, 1984.

Calder suggests that the only

evidence relating to that issue is four lines quoted from
Calder's testimony where Calder denies knowing Bailey had a claim
against him.

Tr., 358, 1. 3-9.
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These four lines of testimony,

however, are taken out of context.

What Calder fails to point

out is that he also testified that when he filed his personal
Chapter 7 in August 1986, he listed over 900 of his former
clients as creditors who had contingent claims against him,
claims which Calder admits are of the same type that Bailey had
in 1984. Tr., 358.

Calder testified that in 1986 he was simply

trying to be careful by listing those 900 clients1 claims. Tr.,
358.

The Panel reasonably inferred that if Calder could

recognize possible claims of clients in 1986 that were the same
type as Bailey's, Calder could have or should have recognized and
listed Bailey's claim before January 1986.
In addition, the evidence of Calder's failure to list Bailey
as a creditor is relevant in that it clearly illustrates Calder's
neglect and carelessness, even in his own personal bankruptcy.
Calder's carelessness in his own case further supports the
Panel's conclusion that Job's and Bailey's testimony as to
Calder's neglect in their bankruptcies was credible evidence.
Finally, Calder challenges this finding because he claims it
fails to mention that Bailey's malpractice action against Calder
was dismissed.
finding.

That fact is irrelevant to this particular

Subsequent dismissal of the action did not relieve

Calder from the obligation to list the claim in his bankruptcy
schedules during the pendency of that malpractice action.
Again, this Finding is supported by the substantial evidence
in the record.
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12.

Finding No. l(o):
Respondent's 1984 Chapter 13 case was dismissed by
Judge Allen on July 31, 1986, as having been filed in
bad faith. The court's order of dismissal is final and
non-appealable. No credible evidence was presented to
indicate that the dismissal of Respondent's 1984
Chapter 13 was for reasons other than that it was filed
in bad faith or that the Bankruptcy Court had any
reason to dismiss the case other than on the merits as
set forth in Judge Allen's ruling of July 30, 1986.
Calder attacks this finding not because it is factually

incorrect, but because the Panel admitted Judge Allen's ruling
which, according to Calder, was contrary to In Re Strong, 616
P.2d 583 (Ut. 1981).

In reaching that conclusion, however,

Calder misreads In Re Strong.

The Court in In Re Strong held

that a disciplinary panel was not bound by findings of another
tribunal and should take evidence to make its own separate
findings to determine whether a disciplinary rule had been
violated.

The Court went on to state that another court's

findings are admissible as any other piece of evidence.

In Re

Strong does not require, as asserted by Calder, that the
underlying transcript of the other tribunal's proceedings must be
produced and admitted into evidence for the Panel to admit
another tribunal's order.
In making this finding, the Panel followed the holding of In
Re Strong by admitting Judge Allen's ruling as evidence and
weighting it as such.

Judge Allen's order is simply one of the

several underlying factors relative to the sanction and is also
additional circumstantial evidence from which the Panel could
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judge Calderfs competence and the credibility of Job's and
Bailey1s claims of incompetence.

The Panel's conclusions and

recommendation of disbarment do not rest solely on Judge Allen's
order; it is merely one piece of evidence.

The fact of Judge

Allen's order is correctly and accurately set forth in this
finding.
13.

Finding No. l(p);
Mr. Bailey was unable to obtain employment for a
substantial period of time due to his inability to
obtain a driver's license.
This finding is based on absolutely uncontroverted testimony

from Bailey.

Tr., 56-61.

Calder does not challenge the finding

itself but rather argues that evidence ought to be excluded
because again it does not comport his own subjective
characterization of the evidence.

Calder offers no legal or

factual reason for striking this finding nor does he show it was
entered arbitrarily or capriciously.

The finding sets forth

uncontroverted facts admitted in evidence.
14.

Finding No. 2(b):
At the time Respondent agreed to file a Chapter 7 case
for Mr. and Mrs. Job, Respondent knew that (1) Mr. Job
was a plaintiff in a lawsuit entitled Job, et al. v.
Pocklington, et al. which was then pending in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah,
Civil No. C82-1085C, (2) Mr. Job was seeking a
substantial amount of money and damages, in excess of
$1,000,000 in such suit, (3) the cause of action had to
be listed as an asset in Job's Chapter 7 case, and (4)
Job wanted the asset listed in his Chapter 7 case.
Notwithstanding this knowledge, Respondent did not take
reasonable steps and precautions to insure that this
cause of action was properly scheduled and listed in
Job's Chapter 7 case.
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In challenging this finding, Calder fails to set forth Job's
complete testimony which supports this finding.

In fact, Calder

11

readily11 admitted his failure to include the Pocklington suit,

in his Statement of the Case at Appellant's Brief, page 11.
Job testified that in initially discussing the filing of a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy with Calder, he told Calder he was concerned
about the bankruptcy interfering with the Pocklington suit
because the lawsuit was so important to him.

Tr., 143.

Job then

recalled Calderfs advice:
And he said, told me, that generally there is a 90
percent chance of the Court abandoning the
lawsuits that I had and they wouldn't continue
with the lawsuits—the lawsuit—and to think that
we're talking about it right here.
Therefore, Mr. Calder talked me basically
into—or, assuring me that it would be all right
and I would be able to go on with my federal
lawsuit.
Tr., 143, 1. 12-19.
On cross-examination, Job then testified that he gave Calder
the case number and case name.

Tr., 199-200.

Job also testified

that the draft of the schedules he reviewed in Calder's office
included the Pocklington suit and that he specifically checked
for the lawsuit. Tr., 146-147. Nonetheless, it is uncontroverted
that the bankruptcy schedules actually filed by Calder did not
include the Pocklington suit.

Tr., 148-149.

Calder denied knowing anything about the Pocklington suit
other than that Job had a "possible" claim.
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Calder further

defended himself by asserting that any failure to list the
appropriate information in the bankruptcy schedules was due to
Jobfs failure to provide him with sufficient information about
the Pocklington suit.

Tr., 488-494,

Calder admitted, however,

that he may not have asked Job for further information or sought
it out on his own, even though he was responsible for ensuring
the accuracy of the information included in the schedules. Tr.,
488-494.
Viewing the above evidence, including Calder's own
admissions, in the light most favorable to the finding, the
Panel's findings that Calder knew of the Pocklington suit and
ff

[n]ot withstanding this knowledge, [Calder] did not take

reasonable steps and precautions to insure that this cause of
action was properly scheduled and listed in Job's Chapter 7
cases" are supported by the record.
15.

Finding No. 2(c):
At the time Respondent recommended that Job file a
Chapter 7, he did not discuss with Job the option of
filing under Chapter 13, and did not mention any
additional advantages which Job might realize if he
elected to proceed under Chapter 13.
Calder asserts that the "only evidence pertaining to this

issue" is Calder's testimony and that his testimony "directly
contradicts this finding."

Appellant's Brief at p. 53.

Though

Calder acknowledges Job's testimony in his brief, the recitation
of Job's testimony in Appellant's Brief is incomplete.

Job

testified that he did not have any conversations with Calder
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about filing a Chapter 13 at the time he initially filed the
Chapter 7 and that he only discussed a Chapter 13 with Calder
later.

Tr., 144, 1. 9-11.

Job then testified that the Chapter

13 was discussed at the time Job discovered the omitted
Pocklington suit.

Tr., 150-152.

That evidence, viewed most favorably to this finding,
clearly supports the finding.

Calder insists upon taking a

microscope to these findings as well as to the testimony,
focusing only on the bold images within the narrow scope of that
microscope.
critical.

When reviewing the record, isolated testimony is not
The Panel is entitled to take the evidence, weigh it

against the evidence in the record as a whole, determine
credibility and make its findings accordingly.
the Panel did just that.

In this instance,

The finding is neither arbitrary nor

capricious.
16.

Finding No. 2(d):
Subsequently, on or about April 27, 1984, Respondent,
rather than seeking to amend the Chapter 7 schedules,
filed a Chapter 13 proceeding, for which Mr. Job paid
Respondent an additional $150.00, even though, in
giving this advice, Respondent knew, or should have
known, that:
1) The Chapter 13 was likely to be dismissed as a
"bad faith filing" in light of Job's previous discharge
under Chapter 7;
2) Job could not "save his home" under the
Chapter 13 unless he had regular income with which to
make payments;
3) The Chapter 13 would be ineffective unless the
previous discharge in the Chapter 7 were revoked or
vacated; and
4) Job would not obtain a discharge under his
Chapter 13 case until he had successfully completed all
payments under the plan.
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With respect to this finding, Calder posits that the Panel
explicitly found that it could not sanction Calder on the Chapter
13 issue and that this finding is contrary to the oral statements
of the Panel,
finding.

This argument is a misreading of this particular

The Panel found that there was no clear and convincing ,

evidence to establish that the filing of the Job Chapter 13 was
inappropriate or a violation of any disciplinary rules. Tr.,
1061.

Pursuant to that, the Panel did not make any findings or

conclusions in that regard.
This particular finding, however, goes to the consequence of
the filing in light of the circumstances of Job's prior Chapter 7
and his absence of regular income.

Judge Boulden's testimony,

cited extensively by Calder at pages 55-57 of his Brief, is
irrelevant to this particular finding because, as noted, this
finding does not challenge the actual filing of Job's Chapter 13.
Judge Boulder's testimony on cross-examination is relevant.
Judge Boulden testified that in her Motion to Dismiss the Job
Chapter 13 case she asserted as a basis for dismissal that Job
had no regular income.

Tr., 671-676.

The significance of that

testimony goes to Finding No. 2(d) subparagraph 2 where the Panel
finds that Calder knew or should have known, and should have
advised Job that one of his objectives - to save his home - could
not be accomplished if he had no regular income to make payments
under the Chapter 13 plan.

It is undisputed that Job had no

regular or prospective income at the time he filed the Chapter
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13.

Tr., 161-163.

Thus, the finding simply conforms with Judge

Boulden's testimony that Job's home could not be saved without
regular income and a discharge could not be obtained without
regular payments.
Further, the real impact of the finding is that Calder knew
or should have known that Jobfs prior Chapter 7 case would be
revoked or vacated for the Chapter 13 to become effective; that
finding at No. 2(d) is not challenged by Calder.

Job had been

clear with Calder that he did not want the Chapter 7 revoked; he
merely wanted the Chapter 7 schedules amended to protect and
include the Pocklington suit as an asset so opposing counsel in
the Pocklington suit would not charge him with perjury and fraud.
Tr., 147-153.
Finally, Calder knew that Job could not obtain a Chapter 13
discharge without completing payments under the plan and Calder
clearly knew that Job had no regular income and no prospective
future income with which to make payments.

Tr., 423-438.

Consequently, Finding No. 2(d)(4) is absolutely true and
accurate.
Again, Calder has failed to show that this finding is
clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious.
17.

Finding No. 2(e):
Respondent withdrew from representing Mr. Job in
July 1984, without Mr. Jobfs consent and knowledge.
At the time of his withdrawal Respondent knew that it
would be difficult for Mr. Job to obtain substitute
counsel to resist the Chapter 13 trustee's pending
Motion for Dismissal.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 57

This finding is supported by uncontroverted evidence.

That

Calder withdrew from representing Job in July 1984 and that Job
only became aware of that withdrawal upon receipt of the same in
the mail is undisputed.

Tr., 160.

Calder makes much of the fact

that the testimony is confusing as to whether Job received the
notice the first part or the latter part of July, 1984. This
fact is quite irrelevant to the finding.
What the evidence shows is that at the time Calder withdrew
he knew the trustee, Judith Boulden, was filing a Motion to
Dismiss Jobfs Chapter 13. Tr., 158; 439-440.

In his notice to

Job of his withdrawal, Calder did not advise Job of the Motion to
Dismiss nor advise Job of any steps he should take to protect his
interests.

Tr., 160-161; Exhibit B-52.

In fact, Calder did not

even advise Job that he might want to seek the assistance of new
counsel.

Exhibit B-52.

Calder knew at the time he withdrew that

Job had no income or assets with which to retain new counsel and
that Job would have difficulty finding counsel.

Tr., 428-429.

In fact, Job tried to resist Calder's withdrawal because he was
unrepresented.

Tr., 162; 429.

Based on those uncontroverted

facts, the Panel concluded that "at the time of his withdrawal
[Calder] knew that it would be difficult for Job to obtain
substitute counsel to resist the Chapter 13 Trustee's pending
motion for dismissal."

Finding No. 2(e).

In his Appellant's Brief, Calder fails to identify the above
evidence in the record supporting the Panel's finding; instead
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Calder summarily concludes that no evidence exists to support the
finding.
18.

That conclusion is simply without merit.

Finding No. 2(g):
On or about August 8, 1984, the Chapter 13 was
dismissed and the Chapter 7 vacated, with the result
that Mr. Job did not obtain any relief under either
bankruptcy chapter.
In challenging this finding, Calder not only engages in

hairsplitting and semantics but again does not discuss any of the
evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the
finding.

Calder merely suggests the finding is "misleading" and

therefore erroneous because it fails to note that Job had the
benefit of the Chapter 7 discharge for a "period of time". That,
however, is irrelevant to the misconduct at issue.

Calderfs

inadequacy and neglect in omitting the Pocklington suit as an
asset and then failing to appropriately follow through to correct
that error is the issue.

As this finding accurately sets forth,

the consequence of Calder's conduct was that Job did not obtain
any ultimate discharge of his debts and these debts were fully
reinstated when the Chapter 13 was dismissed and the Chapter 7
vacated in August 1984. Tr., 163.

This finding reflects an

uncontroverted fact.
19. Finding No. 2(h):
Thereafter, unable to afford new bankruptcy
counsel, Mr. Job filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, pro se,
in an attempt to prevent foreclosure proceedings on the
Jobs' home; the Chapter 11 filing was late and the home
was lost.
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Calder attacks this finding by concluding that the Panel was
attributing to Calder responsibility for the loss of Job's home.
As with many of Calder's arguments, Calder attributes to the
Panel a finding that was not made.

As with his arguments, Calder

interprets and restates the finding differently and then proceeds
to knock it down by claiming no evidence exists in the record to
support his interpretation.
supported by Job's testimony.

This finding is accurate and well
Job did have difficulty retaining

new counsel; he did file his Chapter 11 pro se and late; and he
did lose his home as a result of a foreclosure sale. Tr.,
169-170.

Again, those facts are uncontroverted.

From the events which followed from Calderfs withdrawal, a
reasonable inference can be drawn that Job's difficulty was due
to Calder's improper withdrawal, leaving him without adequate
protection of counsel.

The Panel concluded that Calder's

withdrawal violated DR 7-101(A)(3).

See Conclusion No. 2(d).

This finding does not, however, set forth the conclusion; this
finding sets forth uncontroverted facts.

Based on that, this

finding is neither inaccurate nor does it draw any unreasonable
inferences that are not supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
20.

Finding No. 2(j):
At no time after July 1984 did Respondent
his 1984 personal Chapter 13 case to list
creditor even though he knew that Job had
against him for malpractice and had filed
September 11, 1984, in the Third Judicial
Court, Civil No. C84-5436, asserting such
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seek to amend
Job as a
claims
a lawsuit on
District
claims.

This finding is not actually disputed by Calder and he
admits that he did not amend his personal Chapter 13 to include
the Job malpractice lawsuit until after Judge Frederick ruled in
Job's favor awarding him damages in the principal sum of $55,000.
Tr., 441-442.

Calder merely argues his "justification" for

failing to amend his Chapter 13.
Though he argues to the contrary, Calder did have an
incentive not to list Job as a creditor.

The malpractice action

would have been dealt with in the context of his Chapter 13 plan.
That would have created the very real likelihood that the lawsuit
would be adjudicated before Judge Allen in the bankruptcy court
or that the bankruptcy court would have estimated the contingent
claim for purposes of the Chapter 13 plan.

It is reasonable to

infer that Calder was taking a calculated risk and was forum
shopping by having the malpractice lawsuit adjudicated in state
court before Judge Frederick believing he would prevail.

When

Calder lost the malpractice action, he then sought to take
advantage of the protection of his personal bankruptcy.
175-176.

Tr.,

Judge Frederick refused to stay the state court

proceeding and the execution on the malpractice judgment at that
late date.

Tr., 176.

Calder then sought relief directly through

the bankruptcy court by first by filing a Chapter 13 in March
1986, less than one month after the malpractice judgment was
entered, and then by filing a Chapter 7 in August 1986.
Allen dismissed the Chapter 13 on May 12, 1986.
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Judge

Judge Allen

dismissed the Chapter 7 in September 1988.

Ultimately, when the

only method to prevent Job from executing on the malpractice
judgment was to post a supersedeas cash bond of $55,000, Calder
did so.

Tr., 176-177; Exhibits B-30, B-32, B-33, B-37, B-38,

B-39.
The finding itself is accurate and uncontroverted.
it is not clearly erroneous.

Hence,

Neither is it clearly erroneous for

the Panel to have failed to include Calder's characterization of
the undisputed facts.

The circumstances and reasonable

inferences from the evidence clearly support a different
characterization than Calder asserts.
21.

Finding No. 2(k):
On or about July 16, 1985, at a time Mr. Job was moving
for Summary Judgment in the pending malpractice action,
Respondent filed a Motion to Reopen Job's Chapter 11
proceeding, solely with the intent to harass, injure
and annoy Mr. Job; no valid basis existed for filing
the motion and the motion asserted matters upon which
Respondent had no basis to make such allegations; in
that respect, Respondent knowingly and intentionally
made the following false or misleading statements:
1) That he was a creditor of Job when, in
fact, he had never submitted a bill, previously
demanded payment, or counterclaimed in the civil
action for the payment of any attorney's fees;
2) That the Jobs had intentionally omitted
creditors from their Chapter 11 case when, in fact,
Respondent knew that the claims of such creditors were
contingent and disputed by the debtors;
3) That the Jobs had omitted a debt to a
family member in the amount of $3 5,000 when, in fact,
Respondent had no reasonable basis for asserting such
omission;
4) That the debtor's Chapter 7 schedules
filed in 1983 had shown a gross income in 1982 of
$30,000 when, in fact, the income had been earned in
1981; and
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5) That the Jobs had omitted a substantial
claim to the Internal Revenue Service in the amount of
$5,000-$10,000 when, in fact, Respondent had no
reasonable basis for making this assertion.
Calder does not challenge the factual accuracy of this
finding nor does he assert that the finding is not supported by
the evidence in the record.

Instead, Calder takes issue with the

finding because "it ignores any mention of the justification
advanced by Calder for the filing of the affidavit...."
Appellant's Brief at page 65.

It is the Panel's exclusive

prerogative to reach ultimate conclusions as to whether conduct
such as that set forth in this finding is a violation of
disciplinary rules or whether such conduct supports any factors
in aggravation which go to the sanction.
In this instance, Calder did not introduce any evidence at
the disciplinary trial showing he had a reasonable basis for
making the allegations against Job in the Motion.

The record

contains uncontroverted evidence from Job that he did not have an
outstanding debt to a family member of $35,000; that he did not
omit an IRS claim; that the income of $30,000 was earned in 1981;
and that, though Calder claimed to be a creditor of Job, Calder
had never sent Job a bill, demanded payment of money or sued for
any monies.

Tr., 172-174; 447; 451. Despite Calder's assertion

of some ethical obligation to file the Motion, no ethical
obligation exists to provide a court with allegations which have
no factual basis and which have not been adequately researched.
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This finding is clearly supported by uncontroverted evidence
in the record•
22.

Finding No. 2(m) and 2(n);
2(m) In connection with the civil action entitled
Job v. Calder, Civil No. C84-5436, filed in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, Respondent filed an Affidavit on or about July
18, 1985, wherein Respondent knowingly and
intentionally made the following misstatements and
accusations:
1) That Job was responsible for failing to
list the lawsuit in his schedules when, in fact,
Respondent admits that when Job signed the
schedules, the lawsuit was listed as an asset;
2) That there was M some reason to think that
the debtor may have stolen a key from the
attorney's desk drawer while he was alone in the
office and entered the office at night and effected
certain changes [sic] original document that was to
be filed with the Court11 when, in fact, Respondent
had no facts upon which to base this accusation.
Respondent also stated: "Another theory is Mr. Job
had access to defendant's office and perpetrated a
fraud upon everybody by substituting a false paper
in the papers to be filed with the Court", and
3) That, by insinuation and implication, Job
had tampered with the official files maintained by
the Bankruptcy Court when, in fact, Respondent had
no basis in fact to make any such insinuation or
accusation.
2(n) The Panel finds those defenses, accusations,
and insinuations made by Respondent against Job to be
spurious and indicative of an attitudes of bad faith
which pervades Respondent's conduct in connection with
the Utah State Bar disciplinary proceedings and the
court proceedings.
Finding 2(m) is uncontroverted as can be seen from the

affidavit itself.

Exhibit B-50.

Calder presented no evidence at

trial establishing that he had any factual basis for asserting
that Job stole Calder's office key and changed the schedules or
that Job had access to Calder's office and substituted false
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papers thereby perpetuating a fraud.
is to the contrary:

Tr., 420-423.

The evidence

Job believed that his most important asset

was the Pocklington suit, and he communicated that fact to
Calder.

Job specifically checked on the "working" papers to make

sure the lawsuit was listed.

Tr., 143-144.

dispute nor controvert that evidence.

Calder did not

On the other hand, Calder

had every reason to pass the blame on to Job and was obviously
attempting to do so.
Contributing to the Panel's finding of intent in Finding 2(m)
was Calderfs admission at trial that he intended for the court to
rely on his affidavit in ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Tr., 421.

Calder's speculation in his Appellant's Brief that the

trial court did not attach any weight to the affidavit is
irrelevant to the issue of Calder's misconduct.

Calder intended

for the court to rely on it.
From those circumstances, the Panel could and did reasonably
infer that the misstatements and accusations in the affidavit
were knowing and intentional.

From those same circumstances, the

Panel could and did reasonably infer that Calder's "defenses,
accusations and insinuations...against Job...(were) spurious and
indicative of an attitude of bad faith..." as set forth in
Finding No. 2(n).
As to Finding 2(n), the evidence in the record clearly
supports the finding.

First, the Panel had the opportunity to

observe Calder and assess demeanor and credibility during 5 days
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of trial over a 2 1/2 month period.

The Panel observed Calder

testify on no less than four occasions:

direct examination by

Mr. Leta and cross-examination by Mr. Boone; direct examination
by Mr. Boone and cross-examination by Mr. Leta.

Under the ABA

Standards for Imposing Lawer Sanctions, Section 9.22(f), a
disciplinary panel may consider in aggravation "deceptive
practices during the disciplinary process."

Finding Calder to

have conducted himself in bad faith during the course of the
disciplinary proceeding is certainly appropriate.
Calder asserts that it was improper for the Panel to
generalize that Calderfs attitude of bad faith pervaded Calderfs
"conduct in connection with the Utah State Bar disciplinary
proceedings and the court proceedings."

Calder, however, cites

no authority for that proposition nor does he give any rationale
why it is improper.
The evidence discussed above clearly supports that fact that
Calder1s accusations against Job were without any factual basis.
Calder was attempting to escape liability in the malpractice
action by inappropriate and unethical conduct.

From the evidence

the Panel could clearly and reasonably infer Calder's bad faith
in both the bar and court proceedings.

Findings 2(m) and (n) are

neither arbitrary nor capricious.
23.

Finding No. 2(o):
After Judge Frederick orally rendered his judgment
in the Job malpractice action in favor of Mr. Job, and
before the formal judgment was entered on February 24,
1986, Respondent transferred a substantial portion of
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his property to his wife and brother• Such transfers
are the subject of pending adversary proceedings by
Respondent's Chapter 7 trustee to set aside such
transfers as fraudulent transfers under the Bankruptcy
Code.
This finding is not challenged by Calder as being erroneous.
It is undisputed.

These facts were appropriately admitted into

evidence by the Panel and weighed as any other evidence.

This

finding is simply another circumstance supporting the Panel's
conclusion that Calder acted in bad faith with respect to his
clients, Job and Bailey, and in this instance, particularly Job.
In attacking this finding, Calder merely recharacterizes the
finding by suggesting that the Panel used the pendency of the
appeal proceedings as a basis for the recommended discipline of
disbarment.

Nowhere in the findings or conclusions is such a

statement made by the Panel.
Pursuant to In Re Strong, 616 P.2d at 583, the evidence of
the court proceedings may be admitted and weighed as any other
evidence.

Even though a disciplinary panel cannot rely solely on

another tribunal's findings, the Panel need not wait for the
outcome of the pending appeal because they are not bound by the
decision of the court.

In this instance, the fact of the

transfer of assets is not disputed.
making those transfers.

Calder himself admitted

Tr., 400-403.

The Panel may certainly

use that circumstance along with its other findings to conclude
that Calder acted in bad faith.
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Again, the facts set forth in this finding are undisputed.
Calderfs only objection again goes to the Panel's failure to
include facts which support his characterization of the evidence.
24.

Finding No. 3:
Respondent filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy
proceeding in 1986 in bad faith and it was dismissed by
the ruling of Judge Allen made on May 12, 1986, which
ruling is now final and non-appealable. Respondent did
not file his 1986 Chapter 13 case until March 12, 1986,
after entry of the judgment in favor of Job in the
civil case and after Respondent failed to post a
supersedeas bond to stay enforcement of the judgment
during the pendency of his appeal. Respondent's
interest in filing the Chapter 13 also was to frustrate
the claims of Job and Bailey.
The facts set forth in this finding are again undisputed.

Calder's attack on this finding is focused on the admission of
Judge Allen's ruling, the lack of support in the record for a
finding of intent, and the fact that the Panel failed to include
Calder's characterization of the evidence.

As noted previously,

the Panel admitted Judge Allen's May 12, 1986, ruling consistent
with In Re Strong.
In Re Strong does not require introduction of the underlying
transcript in the other tribunal's proceeding as a prerequisite
or foundation for introducing a judge's decision as evidence.
The Panel may admit the judge's ruling, weigh and rely on it as
any other piece of evidence.

While In Re Strong does hold that a

Panel may not rely exclusively on a judge's ruling, this record
is clear that the Panel received and admitted evidence well
beyond Judge Allen's ruling; the Panel's conclusions as to
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disciplinary rule violations do not rest solely on another
tribunal's findings or order.
In this particular finding, the Panel used Judge Allen's
ruling of May 12, 1986, along with other circumstances which are
set forth in the finding to conclude that Calder's "interest in
filing the Chapter 13 also was to frustrate the claims of Job and
Bailey."

Finding No. 3.

Those other circumstances include the

timing of Calder's filing of his various bankruptcies after the
Job malpractice judgment was entered.
Calder next objects to the fact that "the Panel ignored
Calderfs explanation" of the filing of his bankruptcies.
Appellant's Brief at 70. As has been noted on several prior
occasions, the Panel is not bound by Calder's conclusions,
justifications, explanations or characterizations of the facts.
Such failure does not constitute error on the Panel's part.
Finally, in suggesting that the finding is erroneous because
it fails to reflect Calder's posting of a $55,000 supersedeas
bond in November 1988, Calder fails to disclose that the filing
of that bond came only after Calder exhausted every other effort
to prevent Job from executing on the judgment.
B-37; B-38 and B-39.

See Exhibit B-32;

Only then did he take an appeal from the

denial of a discharge in his Chapter 7 and post the supersedeas
bond.

That was the only remaining avenue to stay execution on

the malpractice judgment.
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Calder has again failed in his burden.

The evidence clearly

shows that the finding is supported by substantial evidence.
25.

Finding No. 4:
When Respondent filed his statement of affairs in
his 1986 Chapter 7 case, he knowingly and intentionally
filed a statement for a debtor f,not engaged in
business11 when, in fact, Respondent knew, at such time,
that he was engaged in business.
Calder himself admitted the facts set forth in this finding.

Tr., 598. The fact that Calderfs trustee in bankruptcy was not
confused by the form used by Calder is irrelevant.

This finding

is further evidence of Calder's carelessness in filing bankruptcy
forms and schedules.

That fact gives credibility to Job's and

Bailey's claims of neglect and carelessness against Calder.
26.

Finding No. 5:
Respondent also filed in 1986 a Chapter 7
bankruptcy action wherein the assets listed are
substantially less than those assets listed in either
Respondent's 1984 or 1986 Chapter 13 schedules.
Respondent had not made any significant transfers of
assets between the filing of his 1986 Chapter 13 and
his 1986 Chapter 7.
This finding is clearly supported by the evidence.

Calder

himself admitted at trial that the assets listed in his 1986
Chapter 7 were substantially less than the assets listed in
either his 1984 or 1986 Chapter 13 schedules.

Tr., 388-403.

Nevertheless, Calder challenges this finding because it does
not reflect Calder's "explanation" of why the bankruptcy
schedules show such a discrepancy.

Calder also asserts that the

finding implies fraudulent conduct on the part of Calder.
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This

finding does not set forth that Calder engaged in fraudulent
conduct,

Calder is once again recrafting the finding so he can

show that his recrafted finding is unsupported by the evidence.
A careful review of Calder*s bankruptcy schedules shows the
differences in the listing of the assets in the various cases.
Even accepting Calderfs explanations for the discrepancies in
the listing of assets, the Panel could reasonably conclude that
Calder was careless in preparing his own personal bankruptcy
cases, thereby giving credibility to Job's and Bailey's claims.
The Panel also could reasonably conclude that Calder had a reason
for reducing his assets in 1986 and for being "more precise11.
After all, it was on February 24, 1986, that Judge Frederick
entered a malpractice judgment of $55,000 against Calder.
Exhibit B-36.

It is not an unreasonable inference from those

undisputed facts that Calder's conduct was an attempt to avoid
paying the malpractice judgment.
In any event, this finding does not postulate any conclusions
or inferences.

The finding sets forth facts which are

uncontroverted.
27.

Finding No. 6;
Respondent was denied a general discharge in his
Chapter 7 case by the Memorandum Decision of Judge
Allen entered on or about September 17, 1988, wherein
the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Respondent's failure to list certain assets in his
Chapter 7 bankruptcy was "knowing and fraudulent."
Calder again relies on an inappropriate application of In Re

Strong in challenging this finding.
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The finding itself is

uncontroverted:

Calder was denied a general discharge in his

Chapter 7 case and the bankruptcy court found fraudulent conduct.
Exhibit B-39.

The Panel properly admitted that order as evidence

of Calder's state of mind.

From that followed the conclusion

that Calder pursued his personal bankruptcies to frustrate Job's
malpractice claim.

This finding does not stand alone in

supporting the Panel's conclusions; it is only one circumstance
among many.

.See, e.g. , Finding Nos. 2(m), 2(n), 2(o), and 3,

which pertain to the juxtapositioning of Calderfs bankruptcy
cases with entry of the malpractice judgment.
This finding is uncontroverted; Calder has shown no error on
the part of the Panel in making this finding.
28.

Finding No. 7:
By an order entered on or about November 18, 1988,
Respondent was denied the right to convert his Chapter
7 case to a Chapter 13 case "in order to prevent [an]
abuse of bankruptcy process."
Calder complains that this finding is beyond the scope of the

formal complaints.

As previously noted, however, Calder's

personal bankruptcies, including the Chapter 7, were specifically
alleged in the Job Formal Complaint (F-274).

This finding simply

sets forth the conduct of Calder in relation to those
bankruptcies.

In addition, as previously rioted, Calder made no

objection at the trial to this evidence.

He had ample

opportunity to meet that evidence in his defense, particularly
since the five-day trial spanned a two-month period.
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Calder has

made no showing of prejudice, nor has he shown that he was unable
to present a full defense at trial to meet this evidence.
The facts set forth in this finding are again uncontroverted.
29.

Finding No. 8:
Considering the time frame of Respondent's several
bankruptcies and the great disparity in assets between
filings and considering the fact that Respondent's
primary creditor in 1986 was Dennis Job with his
malpractice judgment of approximately $55,000 +
interest, Respondent was engaged either in actual fraud
or an attempt to defraud creditors.
The circumstances underlying this finding are uncontroverted:

the time frame of Calder's several bankruptcies; that Calder's
primary creditor in 1986 was Job with his malpractice judgment of
$55,000; and that there were disparities in assets between the
bankruptcy filings prior to the entry of the malpractice judgment
and the bankruptcy filings subsequent to the award of the
malpractice judgment.
B-39.

Tr., 388-403; Exhibits B-30, B-32; B-36 to

The Panel reasonably inferred therefrom that Calder was

engaged in fraud or an attempt to defraud.

A trier of fact in

determining state of mind must infer intent from circumstantial
evidence.

Rarely does the defendant testify that he owns the

"smoking gun" and "pulled the trigger." This finding is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary.

Calder has made no showing that it

is clearly erroneous nor has he even attempted to discuss the
evidence supporting this finding.
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30.

Finding No. 10:
Respondent stipulated to a private reprimand in
1983 in a matter involving approximately 20 different
client matters.
This finding is clearly supported by Exhibits B-40 and B-52

and is included to support the factors found by the Panel
relative to the sanction.

In determining an appropriate

sanction, the Panel may consider prior discipline imposed on the
attorney.

The prior formal complaint (Exhibit B-40) and the

Stipulation of Discipline (Exhibit B-52) are pleadings arising
from that prior disciplinary matter.

The Panel is entitled to

take judicial notice of prior disciplinary matter just as a court
may take judicial notice of pleadings and orders filed in another
case.

Bar Counsel is not required to prove the underlying merits

of the prior disciplinary matter since the prior discipline is a
final, fully adjudicated decision.

Otherwise, prior discipline

cases would be retried in each subsequent discipline matter.
This finding is well within the scope of the Panel's
authority.
C.

SUMMARY

Calder?s challenge to the majority of the findings does not
reflect even a good faith attempt to marshall the evidence in
support of the findings, to discuss the evidence in a light most
favorable to the finding, and then to assert a legitimate reason,
legal or factual, for the evidence failing to support the
finding.

More often than not, Calder has simply reargued the

evidence to conform to his characterizations and has ignored the
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clear and often uncontroverted evidence supporting the finding.
In attacking other findings, Calder has simply recrafted the
finding and then argued that no evidence exists in the record to
support the recrafted finding.

In some cases, Calder creates an

inference from the finding that the Panel did not make and then
proceeds to argue that no evidence supports that inference.
Finally, Calder challenges findings not because they were
unsupported by the evidence but rather because they do not set
forth his alleged justification for his conduct.
Calder attempts to unravel the totality of the findings by
focusing on minuscule details of each separate finding and then
discussing isolated evidence often consisting of his own
testimony which is nothing more than his subjective
characterization of the facts or his excuse for his often
unambiguous conduct.

Calderfs arguments are an attempt to focus

this Court on the trees in the hope it will not see the forest.
The Panel and the Board saw the forest clearly:

Calderfs conduct

in his representation of Bailey and Job and in his personal use
of bankruptcy falls so far short of acceptable professional
standards that Calder ought not be allowed to practice law in
this State.

The evidence taken as a whole clearly and

convincingly supports that recommendation.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 75

V.

THE PANEL ADMITTED AND CONSIDERED EVIDENCE RELATING TO
MITIGATION BUT FOUND THAT NO MITIGATING FACTORS WERE
ESTABLISHED.
Calder argues that three facts or circumstances should have

been found by the Panel to be mitigating factors.

These three

facts presuppose, however, that the Panel adopted Calder's
characterization of the evidence.

First, Calder argues that the

fact that he "volunteered" to assist Bailey in amending his
bankruptcy schedules is a factor in mitigation.

The finding and

supporting evidence determined by the Panel to be most credible
does not support the conclusion that Calder "volunteered."
Calder's 1983 affidavit filed in the Bailey malpractice action
admits that he agreed to assist Bailey at the Bar's request.
Exhibit B-26.

Calderfs agreement to assist Bailey came after

Bailey complained to the Bar and after Bailey had no success in
dealing directly with Calder.

To assert that the Panel's failure

to include that as mitigation is a bootstrap argument.
Second, Calder argues that his posting of the supersedeas
bond in November 1988 is a mitigating factor.

Again, as

previously discussed, the posting of the bond came only after
Calder had unsuccessfully exhausted all efforts to stay execution
of the judgment.
interests.

Filing the bond was to protect Calder's own

It allowed him to pursue his appeal of Judge Allen's

September 27, 1988, decision while preventing Job from executing
on the malpractice judgment.

The Panel did not err in not

finding that factor in mitigation.
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Third, Calder argues that the Panel should have found that
the findings were tenuous in nature and as such, a mitigating
factor.

That argument is ludicrous on its face.

The Panel

obviously did not believe its findings were tenuous after
laboring through five days of trial and then through its
extensive deliberations.
The Panel took evidence and argument and considered whether
factors existed relative to mitigation, but found that no such
factors were established.

Tr., Vol. VII, p. 8 and 160-161.

VI. THE PANEL'S RECOMMENDATION OF DISBARMENT IS PROPORTIONATE TO
THE ETHICAL VIOLATIONS COMMITTED BY CALDER.
The Panel found that Calder committed 15 violations of the
disciplinary rules.

Those fifteen (15) violations involve

conduct which is central to an attorney's fitness to practice and
to the required character of any attorney.
The Panel found that Calder carelessly and negligently
represented Bailey and Job in their bankruptcies.

In doing so,

Calder failed to take responsibility for his own errors and to
correct them, which the Panel found he could easily have done.
In attempting to escape responsibility for his conduct, Calder
intentionally lied to three courts on separate occasions by
filing false affidavits and a Motion in Job's Chapter 11 case
which alleged false facts.

Such conduct was also intended to

harass and injure Bailey and Job in their efforts to seek relief.
As a result of Calder's gross neglect and incompetence, he
intentionally prejudiced his clients' interests:

Bailey was

unable to renew his driver's license from 1979 to 1988; Job did
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not receive a discharge of his debts, lost his home and has never
been able to collect his malpractice judgment of $55,000.
The Panel also found that in avoiding responsibility for his
clients1 interests, he abused the bankruptcy process by filing
personal bankruptcies which intentionally omitted assets and
which were improperly intended to prevent Job from collecting his
malpractice judgment.

Calder also transferred personal assets

for the same purpose.
Calder's dishonesty in making representations to the court
and dealing with his personal assets, his abuse of the legal
process, his abuse of his clients, his entrenched refusal to take
responsibility for his own conduct, and his demonstrated gross
neglect in handling his clients' legal matters evidence such a
defective character as an attorney that Calder presents a present
and continuing danger to the public, a danger that can only be
eliminated by Calder's disbarment.
Those conclusions are clearly supported by the record.

In

fact, Calder does not challenge any of the conclusions of law
entered by the Panel.
In recommending disbarment, the Panel found several
additional factors in aggravation.

The Panel found that Calder

Since the disciplinary trial concluded in January 1989,
Dennis Job passed away due to a known heart condition.
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placed the blame on his clients for the problems they had in
their bankruptcies.

Further, the Panel found that the clients

were particularly vulnerable since the assistance they sought was
in a highly specialized area and they relied on Calder as a self
styled expert in bankruptcy.

The Panel concluded that Calder

could have addressed his clients' problems at the outset but
refused to do so.

And finally, the Panel found that Calder's

misconduct continued over a decade during which time he displayed
a dishonest and selfish motive in filing his personal
bankruptcies, in filing false affidavits in the Job and Bailey
malpractice actions and in his inappropriate handling of both the
Job and Bailey bankruptcies.

See Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law and Recommendation of Discipline at pp. 20-22.
The Panel's findings and conclusions amply support the
recommendation of disbarment.

As noted by the Panel, Calderfs

conduct clearly demonstrates that he is incapable of conforming
his professional behavior to the minimum standard required of
practicing attorneys in this State.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation of
Discipline and enter an order disbarring Calder from the practice
of law in the State of Utah.
Dated this l^T

day of (QfHJUMUVaOlr

, 1989.

Respectfully submitted,
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL
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Sub>-i

Christine A. Burdick
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APPENDIX I

A.

Affidavit of Phil Himmelberger

B.

Affidavit of Barton Blackstok
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'^0F8AR COUNSEL
DANIEL DARGER (0815)
Attorney at Law
32 Exchange Place #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111
Telephone: (301) 531-6636

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ERNEST L. BAILEY,

AFFIDAVIT OF
PHIL HIMMELBERGER

Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD CALDER,

Civil No. C35-300

Defendant.

COMES NOV/, affiant, and under oath, deposes and states
as follows:
1.

That I am the manager of Driver

Improvement/Financial Responsibility for the State of Utah
and as such, it is my responsibility to implement the
statutes and policies of the Department, including those
statutes commonly known as the Safety Responsibility Act set
forth in Sec, 41-12-1, etc-, Utah Code Annotated.
2.

Based upon the case of Perez V. Campbell, 402 U.S.

637 (1971), it is our policy that a discharge in Bankruptcy
of any judgment as defined by 41-12-13 and 41-12-15 of Utah
Code Annotated will relieve the judgment debtor from any
requirements of this act and

such judgment will no longer

operate to deny the judgment debtor a drivers license or
driving privileges.

3.

The records of this Department Indicate that the

above-named individual, Ernest L. Bailey, applied for a Utah
drivers license on March 19, 1979,

However,

his

application was denied as a result of an unsatisfied
judgment that had been rendered against him in regards to a
motor vehicle accident.
4.

This Department received notice from the United

States District Court that Mr. Bailey was amending his
bankruptcy to include the unsatisfied judgment on March 2S,
1979, which was after he had applied for a license.
5.

If the unsatisfied judgment had been included on

his bankruptcy in 1978, Mr. Bailey would have been issued a
Utah drivers license on March 19, 1979.

And Further, if the

unsatisfied judgment would have been added to his bankruptcy
on March 28, 1979, he could of obtainea his Utah drivers
license immediately thereafter.
6.

I have been the manager of Driver Improvement

since July of 1979.
Dated this

c 7 ° / ^ a y of

TVl.cuJ .

8u$,

1986.

Mt,

PHIL HIMMELBERGER

,«A

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s O Q ^

'22&£L——>

1986

L*$k^-

day of

'

J? - ?
My Commission Expires:

sNOTArtYPUBUIC
Residing in:
V', x _.-y^^ /^?
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DANIEL DARGER (0815)
WRC0UNS£L
Attorney at Law
32 Exchange Place #100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6G86

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ERNEST L. BAILEY,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF G. BARTON
BLACKSTOCK

Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD CALDER,

Civil No- C85-800

Defendant,

COMES NOW, affiant, and under oath, deposes and states
as follows:
1.

That I am the assistant manager of Driver

Improvement/Financial Responsibility for the State of Utah
and as such, it is my responsibility to implement the
statutes and policies of the department, including those
statutes commonly known as the Safety Responsibility Act set
forth in Sec- 41-12-1, etc-, Utah Code Annotated.
2.

Based upon the case of Perez V. Campbell, 402 U.S.

637 (1971), it is our policy that a discharge in Bankruptcy
of any judgment as defined by 41-12-13 and 41-12-15 of Utah
Code Annotated will relieve the judgment debtor from any
requirements of this act and

such judgment will no longer

operate to deny the judgment debtor a drivers license or
driving privileges.

Dated this

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
'''"'/y) t'.t-f

day of

, 1986.

i
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in:
My Commission Expires:

/ - , , . .

v^

./

